The Wall Street Journals perceives "corporate successor liability" as a topic of increasing concern to dealmakers. One would think the concern has been there all along, but maybe not when dealmakers think in terms of exiting a company within five years via "liquidity events."
New Thinking and Science As Applied to Regulating Corporations and Compensating Employees After the Fact
Conglomerate has an interesting new December 14, 2011 post by Marcia Narine on new ideas about what science says regarding how corporations should be regulated and how employees should be compensated. The ideas are set out in a book and forthcoming article from Professor Lynn Stout. Excerpts from the blog post are below:
"But how does a corporation really act? Doesn’t it act through its people? And do those people behave like the members of the homo economicus species acting rationally, selfishly for their greatest material advantage and without consideration about morality, ethics or other people? If so, can a corporation really have a conscience?
In her book Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People, Lynn Stout, a corporate and securities professor at UCLA School of Law argues that the homo economicus model does a poor job of predicting behavior within corporations. Stout takes aim at Oliver Wendell Holmes’ theory of the “bad man” (which forms the basis of homo economicus), Hobbes’ approach in Leviathan, John Stuart Mill’s theory of political economy, and those judges, law professors, regulators and policymakers who focus solely on the law and economics theory that material incentives are the only things that matter.
Citing hundreds of sociological studies that have been replicated around the world over the past fifty years, evolutionary biology, and experimental gaming theory, she concludes that people do not generally behave like the “rational maximizers” that ecomonic theory would predict. In fact other than the 1-3% of the population who are psychopaths, people are “prosocial, ” meaning that they sacrifice to follow ethical rules, or to help or avoid harming others (although interestingly in student studies, economics majors tended to be less prosocial than others).
In her forthcoming article “Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of ‘Pay for Performance,’” she applies behavioral science to incentive based-pay. She points to the savings and loans crisis of the 80's, the recent teacher cheating scandals on standardized tests, Enron, Worldcom, the 2008 credit crisis, which stemmed in part from performance-based bonuses that tempted brokers to approve risky loans, and Bear Sterns and AIG executives who bet on risky derivatives. She disagrees with those who say that that those incentive plans were poorly designed, arguing instead that excessive reliance on even well designed ex-ante incentive plans can “snuff out” or suppress conscience and create “psycopathogenic” environments, and has done so as evidenced by “a disturbing outbreak of executive-driven corporate frauds, scandals and failures.” She further notes that the pay for performance movement has produced less than stellar improvement in the performance and profitability of most US companies.
What's the cost to corporations for bad choices ? The question comes back to mind for a couple of reasons. One is the much publicized decision that a 168 year old newspaper will close because of bad choices made during the watch of Rupert Murdoch, a media baron with both financial and political agendas. The ethics issues for his newspaper were long-simmering, and the company reportedly paid to settle some civil claims back in 2009. The issues remained in the public eye, and then recently exploded. Now the affair threatens to materially hurt the political chances of Britain's current leadership because some of the acts occurred during the private career of a current government spokesperson, as described here in the NYT. In short, the claims are that the individual paid off Scotland Yard police officers for information, and allowed phone hacking to develop stories.
Another reminder arrived in May in the form of a $322 million verdict in asbestos litigation involving use of drilling mud - an asbestos-containing product using in oil drilling. The verdict included punitive damages of $300 million. The $ 300 million amount likely will be reduced on appeal under current law on punitive damages, as is briefly described here, and the verdict may be suspect for other reasons. But, regardless of what happens on appeal in a couple of years, the "ask" to settle those cases is now some multiple of the prior price. The defendants now face tough choices as to how they respond.
Plainly the cost varies for bad choices. it's also plain that the cost of bad choices can be multiplied exponentially by public opinion and attention. The exponential loss (or gain) can emerge when public opinion crosses a "tipping point," to borrow the phrase and analysis made famous by author and observer Malcom Gladwell. How companies respond to crisis is crucial, as illustrated by Richard Levick's latest book, The Communicators: Leadership in the Age of Crisis. Both books are well worth reading - and rereading - for anyone involved in "mass tort" litigation.
Managing Future and Current Risks - Directors & Officers at BP Face Class Action Attacks for Alleged Risk Management Failures
Alleged failure to manage risks is of course is a hot topic today in the wake of the financial fiasco. The topic was previously explored in this post focused on insightful comments by Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine regarding intra-company conflicts of interest in corporate management. Today, the news is that as a result of the oil spill, BP's directors and officers face class actions claims for alleged failures in managing the company's risks. One prior complaint regarding the spill is here. TheFirpo case alleges breaches of duty on managing risks, and was covered by Bloomberg. According to Law.com on the Firpo case:
"The first such lawsuit — Firpo v. Hayward, a shareholder derivative suit brought by a Pennsylvania investor — was filed on May 7 in New Orleans federal court. It alleges BP executives and its board of directors "recklessly disregarded accidents and safety warnings for years" related to the Deepwater Horizon rig. The lawsuit accuses the defendants of breaching their fiduciary duties by, among other things, causing BP to violate safety and environmental laws, exposing the company to criminal and tort liability, and subjecting BP to adverse publicity and impaired earnings."
And, BP and its officers and directors also must keep in mind the risk of future lawsuits regarding the adequacy of its current SEC disclosures regarding the spill, a type of claim explained in this prior post that links to a good post from Kevin LaCroix at D & O Diary.
Chapter 11 Cases Fail to Properly Deal with Future International Claims Against Multinationals Heavily Involved in Selling Asbestos Fibers or Products
The point of today's post is to focus attention on issues and topics that arise from relationships between insolvencies and multinationals heavily involved in selling asbestos fibers and/or asbestos-containing products, and their implications for present and future tort claiming and the ability to enforce bankruptcy court injunctions. To illustrate that the topic is well-grounded in fact, the text below provides a specific example, plus the names of books that describe some multinationals which, in addition to Eternit (see last Friday's post), were very heavily involved in global sales of raw asbestos fiber and/or other products containing large amounts of asbestos.
The topic of multinational relationships vis a vis asbestos claiming and insolvencies has been largely free of careful, public attention during chapter 11 cases. As a result, when chapter 11 trusts were created, little or no provision was made for future international claims, meaning claims to be asserted from overseas against an entity now subsumed by a chapter 11 trust. Such claims were at most handled in name only, with virtually no specific anticipation of the volume of or value of future claims from other nations. What's my basis for saying that no one has ever publicly and specifically estimated the volume and value of overseas claims against US trusts? One basis is general knowledge from involvement in asbestos litigation for 25 years. But, more specifically, that also was the conclusion during an asbestos seminar panel discussion last year. The discussion was part of a March 2009 panel consisting of Steve Kazan (a senior member of the asbestos plaintiff's bar and a lawyer who is very active in international asbestos claiming), Francine Rabinovitz (a wonderful economics and policy expert who advises many trusts, companies and others on future asbestos claiming), and me.
Despite the absence of formal, public estimates of overseas claims, some of the chapter 11 cases have included broad injunctive orders granting debtor entities (and non-debtor entities) the widest possible injunctive relief to protect them against any and all possible future claims, on a global basis. Such orders purport to channel all such claims to the trust created in chapter 11. Issuing global injunctions without meaningful notice and due process is a procedure that is deeply flawed for all concerned, and so will not bind all future claimants, thereby leading to endless claiming and wasted attorney's fees.
On a short-term view, the broad shotgun injunction no doubt appeals to debtors because they (usually) want to exit chapter 11 quickly, and also seek maximum future certainty by obtaining the broadest injunctive protection against any and all future claims. But, the short term approach should be tempered by the reality that the company will not be able to enforce an overbroad, unconstitutional injunction issued without meaningful notice and due process. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812, n.24 (1985)(class action cannot bind persons who were not accorded due process); Stevenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3rd 249 (2d Cir. 2001)(class action cannot bind persons who were not adequately represented). Thus, in fact, there is in fact uncertainty if a company is basing its future on an unenforceable injunction.
Overbroad injunctions issued without meaningful notice and due process procedures certainly are adverse for (and illegal as to) a future claimant whose claim may be enjoined when there was no person adequately representing the interest of the overseas claimants whose claims were not actually anticipated in and properly provided for in the insolvency proceedings . As described above, the chapter 11 cases to date have done nothing or very, very little to provide meaningful notice or fair compensation for future overseas claims or claims that arise from corporate interactions, such as joint ventures.
Recognize also that the future claimants also include other corporate entities that will or should be co-defendants in future underlying cases. Like future personal injury claimants, these entities also have not been given meaningful and timely prior notice of proceedings, much less an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. Accordingly, to my knowledge, there have not been any hearings to formally and publicly estimate the amount or value of contribution or indemnification claims that current and future co-defendants could or should assert against an insolvent multinational due to both allegedly contributing to the asbestos "exposures" that lead to "asbestos disease."
What kind of corporate interrelationships exist that ought to be carefully, explicitly and publicly considered in the insolvency cases? Consider, for example, the following excerpt from this paper on Eternit (see also last Wednesday's post on Eternit entities.) Specifically, note the assertion that Eternit entities had tight ties to two major asbestos producers that have now been through insolvency - Johns-Manville and T& N/Turner & Newall. Thus, the Eternit paper asserts:
"1960 Eternit Belgium, Johns-Manville (US), T&N and Eternit France together form TEAM, under whose auspices many new [asbestos-cement] firms are established in Asia.
"70-90 Influenced by the debate around the dangers of asbestos, British and American firms are the first to begin to withdraw from the market. T&N and Johns-Manville transfer their interests in TEAM to Eternit Belgium. In addition, Eternit Switzerland withdraws, selling a growing proportion of its interests to Eternit Belgium. By 1989 almost everything which was originally divided between a number of other firms is in Belgian hands. This includes the US firm Eternit Inc."
Want more? Plenty of facts on inter-corporate relationships are out there through books that describe extensive ties between multinational "asbestos companies." In general, the ties consists of joint ventures, sharing knowledge on manufacturing techniques, and sharing information on asbestos health effects. Companies also interacted with each other through inter-company sales of raw asbestos fiber and other products containing asbestos. All of these actions are ones that may give rise to shared liabilities and/or aiding and abetting liability. Here are some examples of the available books; most of them include significant footnotes and bibliographies:
Asbestos House - The Secret History of James Hardie Industries, by Gideon Harris, is a comprehensive account of that company. Numerous mentions are made of relationships between James Hardie, Turner & Newall, Cape Industries, Johns-Manville, and CSR.
The Way From Dusty Death, by Peter Bartrip, is a comprehensive discussion of Turner & Newall and asbestos regulations in the UK from the 1890s through 1970. This book also discusses interactions between various industry titans, including Cape Industries.
Jock McCulloch has written two books on asbestos, focused primarily on mines in South Africa that were the sources for all of the world's amosite fiber, and much of the world's crocidolite fiber. The mines were owned by Cape Industries entities and various other entities. One book is: Asbestos: It's Human Cost, and was published in 1986. McCulloch's second book was published in 2002, and is titled Asbestos Blues, Labour, Capital, Physicians and the State in South Africa.
Messrs. McCulloch and Tweedale combined to write a 2008 book, Defending the Indefensible, the Global Asbestos Industry and It's Fight for Survival.
In addition, Mr. Tweedale also has written extensively regarding Cape Industries and Turner & Newall/T & N. One of his publications is the book titled Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard.
Global Asbestos Claiming - Report on Asbestos Litigation in Nine Nations - Munich Re's Major Compilation of Information
Here is the online image of Munich Re's recent, comprehensive report on asbestos litigation, Asbestos: Anatomy of a Mass Tort. The 112 page report is authored by Nicholas Roenneberg, and is Order number 302-06142. The report can be downloaded and printed from this page.
The same page, on the right hand side, allows you to order a printed copy at no charge.
The report is quite good. It begins with a review of asbestos litigation in North America. The report goes on to explain and explore various factors relevant to reinsurers such as Munich Re.
Beginning at page 58, the report addresses asbestos claiming in other nations in the context of employers' liability. The report covers the UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, France, Czech Republic, Japan and Brazil. These country-specific reports are well worth reading to better understand the global asbestos claiming situation.
I owe a hat tip and thanks to Christian Lahnstein of Munich Re for bringing the report to my attention this past fall, and for provding value contributions to dialog regarding mass tort claiming. Christian is a very thoughtful thinker and speaker on the subject of asbestos claiming and its consequences. Indeed, he is thoughtful enough that at a dinner before an international asbestos conference this past fall in London, a smart plaintiff's lawyer listened to Christian for a while and then commented that he was surprised to learn that Christian works in the insurance industry.
Eternit, Etex and Asbestos Cement - Global Scale, Decades Ago - How to Deal with Current and Future Claims ?
Monday's post (12/26) pointed out a variety of product liability, corporate law and compensation issues in the context of one nation (India) and a small group of apparently independent asbestos-cement companies. The point of today's post is to illustrate macro level complexities that arise due to the cross-border issues that arise from multinationals, globalization and immigration, among other factors. A few country-specific points also are noted.
Today's post focuses on the large number of Eternit, Etex and other related entities that for decades have comprised a literally global network of manufacturers of asbestos-cement. Today, some of these companies are in the news because of the recent start of an Italian trial to resolve combined civil and criminal charges involving over 2,500 injuries and deaths suffered by persons injured by asbestos inhaled at manufacturing facilities operated in Italy by Eternit entities. In the trial, individual officers and managers face Italian law charges that are more or less akin to reckless homicide, with the charges related to Italian laws requiring a safe workplace. Additional media stories exist because one of the defendants is a billionaire, and he is busy with actions that rightly or wrongly seek to portray Mr. Schmidheiny as a person who is both "green" and concerned about other people.
Global Scale, Decades Ago: What are sources for facts discussed in this post ? As to the entities in general, this substantial paper provides an extensive and apparently reasonably credible hundred year history of various Eternit entities sprawled around the globe (but note the paper is prepared by partisans plainly interested in causing Eternit entities to make compensation payments.) The paper can be skimmed in just a few minutes to obtain a basic grasp of the global scale and inter-connected nature of the operations. A basic summary is that the entities operated across Europe, Africa, South America and Asia. The paper also describes extensive transfers of business operations between and among entities. For more background and specifics on the trial in Italy, please look to the left for prior posts indexed under Eternit and/or go to this partisan website operated by persons who support the injured persons. Articles here and here relate to Mr. Schmidheiny and his image/actions.
The bottom line ? Actions of Eternit and Etex entities, and their officers and managers, plainly caused many deaths and injuries among plant workers around the globe, and no doubt more deaths and injuries of plant workers will follow in future years. One also may reasonably assume that so-called "take home" exposures have produced some number of deaths or injuries among spouses of plant workers through fact patterns such as a wife contracting mesothelioma due to having shaken out and washed a husband's work clothes laden with asbestos fibers. It also seems fair to conclude that injuries and deaths also have occurred and will continue among persons who worked for contractors who performed services at the plants, such as persons who installed, removed, or serviced a factory boiler. In the US, the latter incidents would give rise to "premises liability" claims. In addition, some additional number of current and future product liability claims will arise among persons who sawed, drilled, broke or otherwise worked directly with asbestos-cement or other Eternit products. For all of these groups of current and future victims of disease, one assumes that some significant number of persons and/or their families will have migrated to other nations.
The injuries and deaths arising from decades of global operations and transfers of business operations will provide the factual grist needed for plaintiff's lawyers, defense lawyers and insurance company lawyers to write and argue a wide range of legal positions on a wide range of liability, compensation and insurance issues. The various positions will be further colored by the years in which relevant action or inaction did or did not occur. The issues for example logically would require parsing which entities and/or officers and directors are directly liable to pay which claims, whether as defendants facing civil claims or via mitigation payments to reduce criminal sanctions ? Also, are those entities or persons financially protected by insurance or other indemnities ? Which entities, persons, insurance policies, or insurers are known, still exist , and are financially viable ? Can funds be obtained from solvent reinsurers who lurk behind insolvent primary insurers?
Other issues may arise regarding which entities or persons are entitled to make claims or decisions regarding insurance or other assets. And, all of these issues will arise under the laws of myriad nations. Moreover, health care costs associated with the injuries will be incurred in myriad nations under myriad legal rules regarding the recoverability of such expenses. To the extents the costs are not recovered from Eternit entities, they will have imposed a burden on the "economic commons" of many nations, and those burdens will be suffered for several future decades due to the 20-50 year latency periods associated with cancers caused by asbestos inhalation.
Also consider the impacts of corporate papers written in myriad languages, and myriad rules on discovery. And bear in mind that most of the paper will not be in digital form. Also think about if and when relevant papers were destroyed or preserved.
County-Specific Topics: To highlight just a few of the legal issues, one may look at the Italian trial to see both differences and similarities when compared, tor example, to the US legal system. One difference between US and Italian law is that Italy allows joinder of both criminal charges and civil claims, an approach that would set off shock waves if used in the US. Second, note that the trial includes claims by Italian government agencies seeking to obtain repayment of expenses incurred for medical care for injured persons. Thus, another example of the reality that diminishing government resources lead to more claiming, and that the US is not unique in being a home for lawsuits seeking government cost recoveries. Note also that the Italian system moves more slowly and in different ways than does the US system. Thus the prosecutors gather and share information and evidence in conjunction with testimony taken at various times before one or more judges. Note finally that the trial coverage highlights yet again the risk related to corporate reputation.
Macro Issues: So, who pays, when and how given a history of inter-related entities spread across the globe, many transfers of entities and assets, and many nations with an apparent interest in asserting jurisdiction and trying to provide due process for both claimants and defendants ? And, how does society cope with the reality that some of the victims probably have moved to other parts of the distant from where they inhaled fibers, and that faux victims will emerge ?
Litigation of course is an option. Consider, however, the incredible amount of wasted resources we saw in US asbestos litigation that took place mainly under one language and with mainly state-based rules of law that vary, but are not so terribly different in their general framework. Now consider the inefficiencies plainly ahead when the Eternit/Etex issues described above will unfold globally in myriad languages under rules of law that in some cases are now fixed but in other cases have yet to be written or decided in developing countries.
For all the above issues, who can or should speak for which future personal injury claimants? Who can or should speak for governments or others who incur health care costs resulting from Eternit-caused injuries ? Who can or should speak for other corporate defendants that will be called on to pay for some or all of the injuries caused by work at Eternit plants or by Eternit products? Who speaks for US and non-US asbestos trusts and/or foundations that will be called on to pay for some or all of the injuries caused by work at Eternit plants or by Eternit products? Who speaks for solvent or insolvent insurers or solvent insurers that are trying to cut off their future payments and risks by participating in "schemes of arrangement" in the UK, the United States or other nations?
Focusing this Week on Global Issues and Future Claims, Starting with Articles on Growing Asbestos Cement Use in India
I keep falling off the "global" side of things. So, this week, I'll make a special effort to be more global. This week I'm also going to try to focus more on the wide range of issues regarding "future" claims. By future claims, I mean future tort or business to business claims that possibly, likely or probably will arise as a result of past and/or current and/or future sales of products that involve risks, whether known, knowable or evolving.
Issues to Ponder: The starting point is India and its booming production of asbestos cement products. As detailed in the articles described below, there are myriad entities involved in and expanding their businesses in India producing asbestos cement products. Plainly, the manufacturing process itself sales produces risks of future physical injuries, and so do sales of the products. So, given the asbestos injury debacles still ongoing in North America, Europe and Australia, what should one think about these processes and sales in other nations. Should asbestos fiber be sold at all since, without it, there is no industry ? Should asbestos-cement sales be allowed ? Should the manufacturers be required to issue warnings in languages geared at the likely readers ? How big should the warnings be? How permanent should the warnings be - after all, someone will dismantle or cut these sheets some day in the future ?
Should the manufacturers be required to buy minimum levels of insurance in case they are wrong in their hopeful assessment that risks are low ? Is insurance even available or is there an "asbestos exclusion" of the sort put into place in the US in the early to mid-1980s? Either way, should their be minimum capital requirements for conducting a business that plainly involves some level of risk? Should these companies be allowed to do business for 20 years and then fold up and exit before cancers arise after lengthy latency periods ? Should they exit through dissolution, insolvency, or chapter 11 like proceedings? Should we judge the actions of the companies, their insurers and their customers based on what we know and have been through in the US, Europe and Australia, or should a different standard apply?
If the risks prove to be greater than stated and/or expected, how much should be paid as compensation when future cancers arise? Should legislation be put in place now that will let insurers keep down premiums and that will warn asbestos-cement users that future damages for a potentially horrible death by mesothelioma will be capped at 1,000,000 rupees? But, what happens when exposed persons migrate to new nations, start families and then become sick (or at risk) in other nations? Will those caps apply ? Will the caps apply to risks of cancer or other disease, or just an actual, manifest disease itself?
If there is much future claiming, shall we (once again) blame the lawyers involved? Shall we blame the business persons who went ahead producing asbestos-cement, knowing they were exposing others to risks and failing to confront fully some very real issues with predictable possible future consequences? Or, shall we blame government officials who let the issues go ? Or, shall we just let the topic unfold on its own, trusting that there will be an economic market-based solution ? Will that solution involve litigation funders? Multinational plaintiff's firms?
Will science save the victims ? In 5, 10 or 20 years, will cancer be a manageable disease? Curable? Always? Sometimes ? For some genomes, but not others? For some cancers, but not others? Will it all depend on when the disease is first spotted as having started at the cellular level?
Simply put, we are now at a time where intelligent, sentient beings are not able to credibly deny the foreseeability of the future issues that may arise. Judge Weinstein and others have plainly said that we in the US have collectively done a lousy job dealing with tort law issues. "Conservatives" blame the trial lawyers. The trial lawyers blame "greed" and purportedly "heartless" business persons. Academics ponder and write, some are great but too many lack a real understanding of the real world of business, science and the litigation industries that thrive on insurance claims and tort claims. Those industries, however, do not have all the answers, and so there is the quagmire known as chapter 11
Myriad former manufacturers and sellers of risky products (not just asbestos) are now in chapter 11, some due to actual insolvency caused by product liabilities and some because chapter 11 is a great place to use legal and financial engineering to dump problems and move ahead without the burden of the past. To that end, our nation's bankruptcy judges have issued rulings creating $ 30 billion or more of asbestos trusts. In the process, the bankruptcy judges hear evidence (very loosely speaking) and make rulings about future tort "liabilities" even though they have little or no clue about the real rules of each of the 50 state court tort systems and/or the realities of insurance claiming or paying, and also have little or no clue why state court tort claim settlements and trials turn out as they do. Too often, they do not even allow objectors to appear and they just "bless" deals cut by interested people, all making money from the outcome. Meanwhile, state court trial judges continue to march asbestos cases to trial despite having little or no idea of or regard for what may or should happen with the $ 20 billion still left in the trusts, and the billions more that will be added. And, virtually no one does or says much for companies that stay in business and are stuck paying the financial tab for deaths and injuries that in fact were caused by companies now sheltered by purportedly world-wide chapter 11 injunctions.
All these abstract issues really do matter and need better answers than we have today. But, the answers are not arriving. Why ? In part because the issues quickly become moot for a person dying from (avoidable) cancer. All they may want to do is try to live, or to die gracefully, perhaps leaving some money behind to support a dependent spouse or children. So, they victims say very little, and their lawyers include some good people, but they are busy looking for the next case and in any event are not really the spokespersons for the future victims.
Who really speaks for these foreseeable future claimants? No one, because their interests are in fact not well-served by today's "future's representatives." Why is that so (in my opinion), when the ranks of the futures representatives include some genuinely good, smart and compassionate individuals? The realistic answer includes many factors. One is that futures representatives are hopelessly conflicted between really sick people and the not so sick. (On this topic, see the Amchem decision, the many law reviews after it, and this great article by Plevin, Epley (now Davis) and Elgarten on the specifics of futures representative conflicts in asbestos bankruptcies) The futures representatives also hit conflicts due to the desire to reach certainty, today or "soon," despite the changes science will bring tomorrow. They also are outnumbered and out muscled. And, finally, the bankruptcy code gives them far too little power, and pays far too little attention to current or future science.
Global Context for Why the Issues Matter: On the last two Sundays, The Toronto Star has published an extended pair of articles (here and here) that are well worth reading as they cover in some detail the topics of increasing use of asbestos in India as a "developing country," and plans to export more asbestos fiber from Canada's Jeffrey Mine. The first article focuses on the growing use of asbestos cement to provide less expensive and "better" housing for people living in massive slums in India. The author, Jennifer Wells, candidly confronts the disparities between the "talking points" offered by the manufacturers and government as compared to the reality of actual working conditions in factories and the reality that there are no safeguards on use in the slums. She also points out that all of the warnings on the products are in languages other than Hindi. Ms. Wells also identifies the manufacturers and fiber suppliers.
The second article focuses on the issues regarding Canada's continuing export of chrysotile fiber, and plans to expand the exports from the Jeffrey Mine. The mine was formerly owned by Johns-Manville and has been in use for decades. According to the article, the open pit phase of mining is drawing to a close, but an underground mining phase is perhaps approaching fruition. The article includes some of the needed dialogue regarding the distinctions between the different asbestos fibers. Unfortunately, the article does not report on whether the "new" fiber to be mined has or has not been tested for "contamination" with amphibole fibers.
These article are yet another example of the issues that evolve as "developing" countries face opportunities and choices. In part, they face choices between current and future health risks, and the demands/pressures of industry and a vast population. They also face choices between the financial and health costs and risks encountered by people aspiring to "better" living conditions.
For those interested in more on the topic of banning asbestos, consider Laurie Kazan-Allen's website that documents her many years spent campaigning with others to ban asbestos use around the world. Ms. Kazan-Allen works through an organization known as the International Ban Asbestos Secretariat (IBAS). Ms. Kazan-Allen is the sister of an American asbestos plaintiff's lawyer, Steve Kazan. She has accomplished a great deal to limit the harms that can arise from asbestos use. She also has organized many groups of victims seeking medical care. legislation and/or compensation. The website contains a vast amount of information and is well worth the time to browse for anyone interested in the issues. The website also highlights a paper on and an upcoming conference opposed to asbestos use in Asia. In addition, Steve Kazan provides a website known as the World Asbestos Report.
Others, of course, would say IBAS goes too far in seeking to ban all use of all forms of asbestos. That position is well laid out in the Toronto Star's second article.
Unfortunately, there is no website focused on those who will have the future risk or disease, or the interests of the companies that will in the future pay bills for other companies.
Non-Obvious Issues Arising from Corporate Problems and Subsequent Statements About the Scope/Impact of the Problem
Risk managers and lawyes have to think even more about divergent types of fallout from a corporate problems. The point is illustrated by this great post from Kevin LaCroix at D & O Diary. in the post, he airs various non-obvious liability, risk and D & O issues rising from Siemen's problems with corporate bribery. One of the non-obvious problems is a subsequent securities suit that arose from later statements by Siemens about the revenue impacts that would or would not follow from stopping the use of bribery.