New 2d Circuit Opinion in Freelancer Litigation Highlights Conflicts of Interest in Settling Mass Tort Claims

Settling mass tort lawsuits is not easy. It's even harder if conflict of interest rules are followed. The conflict of interest rules are illustrated by a brand new 2d Circuit opinion rejecting a proposed class action settlement in copyright infringement litigation brought by various groups of freelance writers against major publishers. The topic becomes more timely by the day as NY's AG faces pressure to settle claims against the uber banks regarding some of their activities.  Gretchen Morgenson's August 21, 2011 NYT article details new pressures - this time from the Obama Administration.

The bottom line of the freelancer opinion is that it rejected a class action settlement based on inadequate representation of one subclass.  Bloggers are starting to look at and discuss the opinion in its  broader context, so I will not repeat their analysis. A very defense-side post is here, and Alison Frankel's insightful analysis is here

Three further points, though, deserve mention. One is that the opinion arises in a formal class action. Therefore, some would say the opinion only applies in a formal class action. But others would argue the opinion applies to any case involving mass torts because the fundamental issue of inadequate representation cuts across legal pigeonholes. So, one can easily envision settlement opponents citing this case for the proposition that a settlement cannot be crammed down on (that is, binding on) persons who were not adequately represented in the settlement negotiations. Someone in Mr. Schneiderman's position presumably would make that argument. 

The entire set of issues raises the point that old issues return and become new issues, and that's true of the issues arising regarding class actions, finality and conflicts of interest. Indeed, Judge Rakoff's class certification ruling against B of A causes one to think again of the days in which "issue predominance" was considered the key to class actions. See here for a brief but pointed history, once again tied to product liability claims. The finality issues also bring to mind the Second Circuit's Agent Orange opinion holding that new personal claims could not be deemed settled by the prior class action litigation (an article is here as the case went up), an opinion the Supreme Court did not change after a 4-4 tie when Justice Stevens recused himself, apparently because his son served in Vietnam. Here is IIT Kent's compilation of Supreme Court argument materials and the opinion from its Oyez site.  Here is a 2010 defense-side summary of 30 years of Agent Orange litigation. And, here is an interesting article comparing habeas proceedings to class actions in terms of finality.  

Another interesting part of the opinion involves whether the settlement could be deemed fair based on evidence submitted by mediators and others. The dissent points to the mediator  and his affidavits as providing a basis  to approve the settlement.  See the Dissent, at 10. On the other hand, could we really expect involved persons to testify that they reached an unfair settlement ? The majority was not persuaded that the evidence should control.  The relevant evidence included Kenneth Feinberg swearing to the opinion that all interests were adequately represented. According to the opinion, Mr. Feinberg stated in a sworn declaration that “[a]ll members of 14 the defined class   . . . were adequately represented during the lengthy course of the mediation” and that “[a]ll sides exhibited great skill and determination . . . resulting in a comprehensive settlement of a very complex matter which [he] believe[s] is the fairest resolution which could be obtained.”  The participation of mediator Feinberg in this case, while by no means ensuring fully adequate representation, does make it more likely that the parties reached the limits of compromise.  See generally D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (“This Court has noted that a court-appointed mediator’s involvement in pre-certification settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the proceedings were free of collusion and undue pressure.”).  

 

 

 

Conflict of Interests and International Tort Claims for Persons from Many Countries - The Libyan Terrorism Example

Here is an unexpected but interesting non-asbestos example of conflict of interest issues arising from efforts to resolve "mass torts" for various persons around the world. The example arises from the airplane crash and airplane hijacking blamed on Libyan terrorists. The article describes a recently filed lawsuit in which two victims of the crash object to the terms of the settlement with Libya. In brief, the two plaintiffs argue that the lawyers who represented the crash victims, Crowell & Moring, operated under conflicts of interest and that the agreement improperly commingles the interests of the various different categories of claimants, including US and non US claimants. The article includes a link to the complaint itself. The complaint, however, does not attach a copy of a "joint prosecution" agreement apparently signed by the plaintiffs and many others.

Here are excerpts from the article by Roger Alford:

"The facts as alleged in the complaint of Davé v. Crowell & Moring are complex. In brief, Libya has been implicated in terrorist activities on numerous occasions, most notably the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan on September 5, 1986 and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988. In 2005, victims of these terrorist attacks and their heirs--including American and non-American victims--retained the law firm of Crowell & Moring--known for representing victims of terrorism--to pursue litigation against Libya. The Davés were among those who signed the Crowell & Moring retainer agreement. As part of retaining Crowell & Moring, every client was also required to sign a joint prosecution agreement ("JPA"), a provision of which provided that the proceeds recovered by any signatory to the JPA shall be shared on a sliding scale based on type of injury with all signatories to the JPA, without distinction as to nationality. Only 23% of the victims who signed the JPA were American. A Liaison Group consisting of one American and four non-Americans was established as agents for the victims in their dealings with litigation counsel. The Liaison Group was represented by Latham & Watkins. In 2008, the United States government entered into a bilateral treaty with Libya for an award of compensation for all U.S. nationals harmed by Libyan terrorism, including the victims of the Pam Am Flight 73 hijacking, which included plaintiffs Gargi and Giatri Davé. The treaty provided for distribution of these funds through the Treasury Department's Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FCSC"). After the Davés successfully received notice of their entitlement to millions under the FCSC process, Crowell & Moring issued a demand letter to the Davés contending that under the retainer agreement and the JPA the funds secured by the United States government pursuant to the U.S.-Libya treaty on behalf of American victims are to be shared among all of the victims of Libyan terrorism, American and non-American alike. In other words, the vast majority of the funds secured by American nationals under the U.S.-Libya treaty are--approximately 90% according to Crowell & Moring--required to be paid to non-Americans pursuant to these private agreements."