Asbestos Product Catalogs For Sale Online - The Perfect Item For Claimants Against Chapter 11 Trusts

                                        

For several years, it's been well known that eBay traders could make some money selling to plaintifff and defense lawyers old asbestos-containing products, including even old vehicles. Typically the products were acquired for use as trial exhibits.  Now,  this online web site  is trying a new marketing approach -  advertising old asbestos product catalogs as perfect items for claimants against  some or all of the over 80 chapter 11 trusts created by entities that have entered chapter 11 due to asbestos product sales.  I can imagine this working, especially for defendants stuck in the tort system that need to take discovery from plaintiffs regarding their use of products made by former defendants that exited the tort system via chapter 11.  Thus, the website home page urges:

"An excellent resource for help with Asbestos Trust Claims, research material, attorneys preparing litigation, abatement professionals, and anyone interested in knowing what everyday products contained asbestos."

All research material is actual manufacturer's catalogs and brochures in downloadable Color PDF format.

All catalogs can be purchased using  a Credit Card Card     for $39.95 each."

 The online images show old product catalogs from various former manufacturers of asbestos-containing products. Go here for the first page of an old Manville catalog for its industrial products, or go here for its transite board catalog. Or,  go here to relive Eagle-Picher’s wide range of fine ACM.   Or see below for the image from Pitt-Corning's catalog for Unibestos, a product that contained amosite.

 

More on the Palermo Claim to the Manville Trust 37 Years After Death

Thanks to information contributed by professional contacts, more information is coming out regarding the previously described "Palermo" claim to the Manville Trust, and a related federal court lawsuit against the DII Trust by the same claimant. The claims are unique because they are being made over the last four or so years, some 37 years after Mr. Palermo's death in 1966. This window into the asbestos trust world was opened by public publishing of opinion in Gail Garner v. DII Industries, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9583 (Feb 4. 2010).

Here is an image of the complaint mentioned in the federal district. The complaint includes some very interesting correspondence with the Manville Trust regarding the claims raised.

Here  is an online post that appears to be by the claimant, who says she is Mr. Palermo's daugher. The post is to a public website.

In short, it appears the daughter of Mr. Palermo is an active pro se litigant seeking money for his estate from at least 7 trusts. And, judging by the attachments to the complaint, there are multiple other unusual "extraordinary circumstances" claims to the chapter 11 asbestos trusts.

One can certainly appreciate the logic and reasons for the claims asserted by Ms. Garner on behalf of the estate. On the other hand, it's pretty amazing to see this happening and think about the defense side consequences. The claims also shed some light on propensity to claim, and various factors related to the appropirate amounts of compensation of claims so long after death. The claims also raise issues about whether and how much lawyers are needed for claims to chapter 11 trusts.

Most importantly, taken as a whole, the papers provide yet a precise example of why the actions of the chapter 11 trusts and the trustees should be transparent instead of cloaked in secrecy. The public and the policy makers of our day should have access to the facts. On secrecy, here's another plug for a 2009 law review article written by Stephen Wm. Smith, a United States Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Texas, Houston division. See "Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade," 3 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. # 2, 177 (2009). The full text article is available here, and is free.




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From: http://www.deanamartin.com/Ask/ask_may05.asp

Dear Deana:

I just read your book in 2 sittings. I enjoyed it. It surprised me. There was much heartbreak as there was much enjoyment. My life was similar. My dad, Angelo Palermo, (Italian American) was away at work a lot (spray coating asbestos) and he lost a daughter (my sister) in a tragedy (she drowned), four years before he died. He died at age 51 of cancer. While I was reading your book, on page 198 you stated 'Dad, inhaling deeply on his Kent cigarette...' I have an old ad about Kent cigarettes having asbestos filters. Thirty-four (34) years after the death of my father, I put in a claim against Johns-Manville, a large asbestos company. No attorney would take the case but I did it on my own, and won. I now have 6 more claims in against other asbestos companies. I believe you have a case to sue for asbestos wrongful death. There is no statue of limitation (discovery rule). I can help you and I would like some assistance in how I can publish a book about my case. Please respond. Really enjoyed your book. Our family, including my father, loved your father.

Sincerely,

Gail Palermo Garner

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How Often Does Manville Trust Diagnose (and Pay?) Claims 37 Years After Death ?

Today, a new example of issues that arise from secrecy in asbestos litigation. The question in short: How often do asbestos trusts diagnose claims 37 or so years after death, and how often and how much do they pay out for claims that would ordinarily be barred by statutes of limitation?

Chapter 11 asbestos cases, and asbestos trusts, are noteworthy for a penchant for secrecy. The penchant for secrecy applies even though secrecy is perhaps the greatest antithesis of due process, and was an especially detested feature of Star Camber proceedings, as described here in simple terms and here at some length in a wonderfully easy to read but thorough 2009 law review article written by Stephen Wm. Smith, a United States Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Texas, Houston division. See "Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade," 3 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. # 2, 177 (2009).

Judge Smith explained the problems with secrecy, at 214:

"In our common-law tradition, the exercise of judicial power is an inherently public act. A court of record, by definition, is a court that acts on the record, placing its rulings in the public domain, whether by pronouncement in open court, handwriting on a parchment roll, typing on a docket sheet, or digital key-strokes on-line. It is not merely that publicity has many virtues--promoting public confidence in courts, enhancing reliable fact-finding, and curbing judicial abuse of power. Nor is it simply that the people have already bought and paid for the right to know what their judges do with their office. Rather, it is the public record of judicial decisions that renders those decisions legitimate. Philosophers from Kant to Rawls have written treatises on why this is so, but one of our colonial forebears nailed it with only eight words: "Justice may not be done in a corner."

How does secrecy play out in asbestos litigation ? In  many ways, and they are not all covered here.. For prior examples of asbestos trust secrecy, go here (absence of material data about Manville Trust payments to the not sick), and here (Manville Trust withdrawing data previously made public under licensing agreements).  Here's a new example that arises because of an opinion sent along by a friend out east when he enountered a new federal district court opinion that involves asbestos trusts.

According to the pro se complaint,  a Mr. Palermo worked with asbestos-contiaing products while working for Halliburton, and "[o]n June 6, 2003, Palermo was posthumously diagnosed with mesothelioma "by a tribunal of asbestos experts who were part of the Extraordinary Claims Panel of the Manville Trust." (Am. Compl. P 17.)  How odd is that? To me, it's quite odd since the complaint also alleges that Mr. Palermo had died back in 1966 of metastasis from "stomach cancer."

If true, the allegations  indicate that a diagnosis was made some 37 years after death. One may also assume a payment was made by the Manville Trust. The complaint goes to on complain - unsuccessfully - that another trust would not make a payment.

So, what does this all mean in the larger context?  It's fairly easy to think that Mr. Palermo may well have actually died of peritoneal mesothelioma due to asbestos-inhalation. And, surely there are arguments to be made for paying compensation whose deaths were wrongfully caused, regardless of the date of death, but those arguments have not succeeded when statutes of limitation are applied.  So, for purposes of social policy decision-making, one does have to wonder how often claims of some age are made, how the post-death diagnosis was made (old tissue ? medical records? narrative?), and how much money is paid out each year by the trust for claims of this ilk.


Can answers be obtained? I don't know, but will send an email off to the Manville Trust and will let you know if I hear anything back.
_______________________________________________________________________________

Here are key excerpts from the opinion in Gail Garner v. DII Industries, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9583 (Feb 4. 2010).

"Viewing the allegations in the amended complaint as true, the following are the relevant facts for consideration of the present motion. The decedent, Angelo Palermo ("Palermo"), was a union insulation mason for twenty-nine years from 1937 through 1966 in the construction asbestos industry. He spray coated and handled asbestos-containing products while working for one or more of the Haliburton or Harbison-Walker entities. Palermo died on April 23, 1966, at the age of 51 years. (Am. Compl. PP 14 & 34.) His death certificate listed the immediate cause of death as acute liver failure due to "metastasis cancer due to primary stomach (place of origin)." (Am. Compl. PP 11-15.)




On June 6, 2003, Palermo was posthumously diagnosed with mesothelioma "by a tribunal of asbestos experts who were part of the Extraordinary Claims Panel of the Mansville Trust." (Am. Compl. P 17.) On April 4, 2006, Plaintiff filed a claim with DII Industries, LLC, and, the following day, filed a claim with the DII Trust, with regard to her father's death. Defendants eventually rejected the claims, and a pro bono evaluator confirmed Defendants' denial. (Am. Compl. PP 18-27.) (emphasis added)

Will There Soon Be Another Chapter 11 Tort Claim Trust for Chinese Drywall Claims Against an Insolvent Builder, Perhaps With Insurers Involved ?

This summer brought the Chrysler and GM chapter 11 cases in which bankruptcy courts issued wide-ranging injunctions that seek to block some or all tort claimants from pursuing some or all current and/or future tort claims against the insolvent entities and their successors and/or buyers. Now, as we move into fall, here's the latest example of the expanding use of chapter 11 injunctions and trust funds as the proposed means to resolve underlying alleged "mass tort" claims. These ongoing expansions make it even more important to scrutinize the rules to the process by which Wall Street is now able to use chapter 11 to eliminate or transfer financial responsibility for underlying mass tort claims. These ongoing expansions also make plain that there is a pressing need to pull down the veil of secrecy that blocks meaningful scrutiny of the operations of most, if not all, chapter 11 trust funds that resolve tort claims.

This latest example arises from this new motion filed in the Tousa home builder bankruptcy. The effort in Tousa parallels the approach taken in the WCI home builder chapter 11 case. The new motion in Tousa seek to continue the automatic stay to block tort and contract claims regarding buildings built with allegedly defective Chinese drywall. The motion seeks to continue to block the underlying lawsuits based on the prospect of creating a chapter 11 trust to resolve the same underlying lawsuits. Presumably the trust also would be used to resolve the claims that would arise if the court were to allow a proposed class action against Tousa by would-be drywall claimants . The proposed class action is the subject of other bankruptcy court motions.

The motion in Tousa is noteworthy for multiple reasons. For one, it asserts that the debtor will welcome the involvement of its insurers in creating the proposed trust. In contrast, in the asbestos chapter 11 cases, the debtors virtually always assert that trust are "insurance neutral," meaning that whatever happens in the bankruptcy court does not effect the rights of insurers. Based on that claimed neutrality, the debtors and plaintiff's lawyers almost always argue that the tort claim insurers lack "standing" to be involved in the bankruptcy court proceedings.

Insurers sometimes but not always disagree, depending on what view suits a particular insurer's interest in a particular chapter 11 case and its overall financial status. Usually, but not always, insurers that issued primary policies re heavily exposed to the tort claims, and so will seek to cut a deal with the debtor and the plaintiff's bar in order to achieve certainty. Other insurers that issued higher level excess policies tend to fight the debtor on the standing issue until they've created enough of a record that the debtor agrees to accept from the high-level insurer a nominal payment over time in return for a release of all obligations under the higher-level excess insurance policy.

The motion also is noteworthy for what it does not mention. For one, it makes no mention of the current or future rights of other, solvent companies that are now or will in the future end up as co-defendants in the underlying lawsuits. Co-defendant entities can be incredibly harmed by the terms of the bankruptcy trust if the terms cut off or in any way limits the right of co-defendants to bring cross-claims or equitable contribution claims against the debtor or the trust. In the chapter 11 asbestos cases, the trust terms almost always have imposed severe and unconstitutional limits on the rights of the co-defendants to bring cross-claims against the debtor or the trust. To be fair to co-defendants, bankruptcy courts can and should appoint at least one person to represent the interests of fat least future co-defendants.

Additional adverse impacts arise for co-defendants if secrecy is allowed regarding claims submitted to the trust fund and its payouts to particular claimants. Once again, the chapter 11 trust model should not be followed because in most such cases, the plan tosses a veil of secrecy over information regarding which claimants have made claims and what they have been paid. Co-defendants rightly argue that the veil of secrecy is poor public policy because court-ordered trusts should instead be transparent as a matter of public policy. Beyond pure policy issues, the veil of secrecy also is improper because it blocks the co-defendants from asserting state law rights. Secrecy also blocks legislators from understanding what really is or is not being done to compensate legitimate and illegitimate claimants.

The motion also is significant because it does not mention various other sources of conflicts between constituencies with interests in the terms of a trust created to resolve tort system claims. One source of conflicts is that persons with strong and serious claims do not want to see trust fund money frittered away on payments to spurious or marginal claimants. Once again the asbestos chapter 11 cases highlight the problem because most of the trusts have been put in place with terms that have allowed billions of dollars to be paid to claimants who are not "sick" in any meaningful way.

Here are key excerpts from the Tousa motion:

4. Among other things, the Debtors are aware of the recent plan of reorganization confirmed in the chapter 11 cases of WCI Communities, Inc. and certain of its affiliates (collectively, "WCI") in which WCI successfully managed its liability with respect to Chinese Drywall by implementing a global strategy that will address Chinese Drywall claims through the use of a trust, a channeling injunction and claims liquidation procedures. Additionally, the plan of reorganization permitted WCI to efficiently address its' claims against its insurance carriers as well as the installers and manufacturers of Chinese Drywall. While the Debtors continue to analyze their own Chinese Drywall cases and their prospects for a chapter 11 plan, the WCI approach offers one possible alternative to piecemeal litigation of Chinese Drywall claims.

5. The Debtors intend to work with their major creditor constituencies in an effort to establish a global strategy with respect to claims arising from or relating to Chinese Drywall. This global strategy will prevent a "race" to insurance proceeds by similarly situated claimants that will have the negative effect of depleting the amount of insurance available to satisfy other claims or, otherwise, impact the Debtors' ability, as a practical matter, to craft a more comprehensive resolution of the Chinese Drywall-related claims. To that end, the Debtors intend to involve the alleged holders of Chinese Drywall-related claims and the Debtors' insurance carriers in any such discussions. Based on the Debtors' desire to develop a global resolution of the Movants and similar claims, the Debtors have filed this objection.


Hat tip to LAW360 for noting the motion to continue the automatic stay.

AWI Asbestos Personal Injury Trust Selling Shares Under Prepaid Variable Forward Sales Contract - Is This The Way a Court-Ordered Trust Should Work ?

When and how does an asbestos trust own enough shares of the company for which it assumed "asbestos liabilities" ? And, should chapter 11 trusts be involved in transactions of a type that some say are sometimes tax dodges?

These questions are posed for several reasons. One is that under bankruptcy code section 524(g), a chapter 11 asbestos trust is required to own prescribed amounts of shares of stock of the company for which it assumed asbestos obligations. That rule, some say, is mainly honored in the breach.

Another reason for posing the questions is that it is interesting to watch the ways in which the trusts sometimes act much like, if not exactly like, the corporate financiers that plaintiff's lawyers often trash in the course of jury trials. How so? Below are the facts and links regarding the AWI Trust recently using a prepaid variable forward sales contract to cause the more or less sale of shares of AWI.

What is a prepaid variable forward sales contract? It is one of the many exotic financial paper created by Wall Street to create new ways to own and sell shares of stock without, they say, selling shares. (One is reminded of Humpty Dumpty's scornful proclamation " When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less." )

The IRS has declared a war of at least strict scrutiny on these transactions as potentially or actually illegal tax shelter transactions, as described here by the TaxProfBlog and here by the NYT. This WSJ article explains that the transactions also have been attacked as tools used by executives to sell shares ahead of price drops without really selling shares, they say.

Call me naive, but doesn't it seem odd that trusts operating under the aegis of federal courts would engage in transactions of a type the IRS deems dubious ? No doubt the trustees and the trust advisory committee would counter that they have a fiduciary duty to make money for claimants. Maybe true, but that sounds an awful lot like the corporate argument that we have a duty to our shareholders to make money. In personal injury jury trials involving risks and cost benefit analysis, plaintiffs love to attack the corporate duty to make money argument as putting profits ahead of people, or profits ahead of morals.

On the subject of the AWI Trustees and the Trust Advisory Committee (TAC ) wouldn't you think the Trust's website would identify them? If it does, I sure can't find the names anywhere despite using the search box on the website to search for names including Kazan, Weitz and Cooney. I dropped the trust an email this morning asking for the names and whether I missed them on the website. We will see if an answer comes back.

____________________________________________

On August 11, Armstrong World Industries announced that its Asbestos Trust is raising $ 180 million in cash by selling some shares outright and more shares pursuant to a prepaid variable forward sale contract that is said to be part of reinvigorating AWI. According to the press release from Armstrong World Industries:

"Armstrong World Industries Comments on Sale of Asbestos Trust Shares to TPG
LANCASTER, Pa., Aug. 11 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- TPG Capital ("TPG") announced it has agreed to purchase seven million shares of Armstrong World Industries, Inc. ("Armstrong") (NYSE: AWI), and economic interests in an additional 1,039,777 shares, from the Armstrong World Industries Inc. Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust ("the Trust"). TPG's purchase price per share of $22.31 is the 20-day trailing volume-weighted average price through Friday, August 7. The transaction is expected to be completed during the next several weeks, and will result in approximately $180 million of proceeds for the Trust. (emphasis added). "


A form 4 from the Trust explains the transaction as follows:

"Explanation of Responses:
1. On August 10, 2009, the reporting person entered into a prepaid variable forward sale contract with TPG Partners V, L.P. and TPG Partners VI, L.P. (collectively, "TPG"). The contract obligates the reporting person to deliver to TPG 1,039,777 shares of AWI common stock (or cash as provided in the contract) on the maturity date of the contract. The maturity date is the 20th trading day beginning on November 4, 2013. In exchange for assuming this obligation, the reporting person will receive $23,197,425 at closing of the contract.
2. The reporting person pledged 1,039,777 shares of AWI common stock (the "Pledged Shares") to secure its obligations under the contract. While the reporting person retained dividend and voting rights in the Pledged shares during the term of the pledge, the reporting person is obligated to pay TPG dividends received on such shares and is party to a shareholders agreement with TPG relating to such shares.
3. The settlement price will be based on the 20 day AWI common stock price preceding the settlement transaction date, and the contract can be settled in cash or in the release of sufficient Pledge Shares to satisfy the settlement payment (as determined at the settlement price)."

The James Hardie Saga - Tax Regulator Will Gain Access to Asbestos Papers

James Hardie's asbestos trust continues to create issues. Here is an article regarding the Australian tax regulator seeking and gaining access to asbestos-related papers, apparently including papers exchanged with its accountants. Trusts are plainly an excellent concept for resolving asbestos and other toxic tort claims without massive litigation waste, but they are indeed complex undertakings.

New Article Regarding Some Positive Developments in Coordination Between the Tort System and Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts

A new article is out regarding problems with asbestos bankruptcy trusts, which are the antithesis of transparency, as previously described here and here. In a prior article last year, three Cozen O'Conner lawyers (they represent insurers) wrote a significant Norton Bankruptcy Journal article detailing the lack of transparency in the asbestos trusts. The authors are William P. Shelley, Jacob C. Cohn and Joseph A. Arnold. You can obtain the full article here at Cozen's website.
Now, Messrs. Cohn and Arnold are back with an updating June 22, 2009 article titled: New Generation of Asbestos Trusts Encourages Double Dipping. The article is published at the Daily Journal, which requires a subscription.

Among other things, the article describes two recent events that are helping focus more sunshine on the asbestos trusts and give trial defendants the benefit of offsets. Thus, they describe a Washington state court decision in which a trial judge allowed "asbestos defendants "a setoff for amounts: "received to date," "agreed to and to be received," "that can be obtained by application to existing bankruptcy trusts" and "that can be obtained from bankruptcy trusts expected to soon become available" Coulter v. AstenJohnson, 2008 WL 4103199 (Wash. Super Ct., May 30, 2008). The authors also address developments in Los Angeles where the judge presiding over asbestos cases issued a May 27 Third Amended General Order No. 29 requiring plaintiffs to file a case report disclosing basic product identification and exposure information, and to attach a "copy of each bankruptcy proof of claim relating to asbestos exposure which plaintiff(s) has submitted to any bankruptcy Trust."

As simple as those steps sound, most trial courts have not yet entered similar orders. Why? Some plaintiff lawyers have too often managed to defeat letting sunshine make a its way into asbestos trusts. Much more sunlight is needed.

NonMalignant Claims Going Back Up If You Judge by the Manville Asbestos Trust Report for Q 1 2009

Walter Olson 's PointofLaw has a June 12 post about Judge Weinstein writing a pessimistic paper about the way courts handle mass tort claims. Judge Weinstein may feel the need to write again after considering the Manville Trust's quarterly report for the 1st quarter of 2009. The report is available here, and is depressing both for what it shows and what it does not show.


The visible and depressing part of the report involves nonmalignant claims - the ones that seemingly have been fading away. But, that's not true for Manville during the first quarter of 2009. Instead, nonmalignant claims went back up - significantly - contrary to prior trends. They are said to be category 2 nonmalignancies, which means "asbestosis/pleural plaques" with a scheduled payment of $12, 000 (subject to prorated payment ) under the terms of the 2002 Manville TDP procedures available here - see page 7.

Specifics? Doing a little math from figures shown in the report's cover letter to Judges Lifland and Weinstein, it looks like there were about 2,900 nonmalignant claims, which is far more claims than ALL the Manville claims filed in 1Q 2008. According to the report's cover letter:

"During the first quarter of 2009, the Trust received 4,853 new claim filings compared to 1,776 for the same period of 2008. The malignant filing population has accounted for approximately 40% of the total for the first quarter of 2009 claim filings compared to 68% for the first quarter of 2008. The percentage decrease in malignancies is attributed to the sharp increase in the filing of unimpaired non-malignant Level 2 claims." (emphasis added)

"The Trust settled 3,749 claims for $30.4 million during the first quarter 2009 compared to 1,582 claim settlements for $14.8 million during the same period of 2008. The average settlement amount for the first quarter of 2009 and 2008 was approximately $8,100 and $9,300, respectively. Once again, the decrease in the average settlement amount is due principally to the higher percentage of non-malignancy claims settled during the first quarter 2009."


Also depressing is the lack of data in the report to tell readers where these nonmalignant claims are coming from and the nature of the supporting proofs. Are these claims from persons resident in the US or persons who live overseas? Are some of these claims from older claimants who perhaps really did inhale large amounts of Manville fibers, or are some these claims from younger claimants with x-rays read by physicians of dubious repute who have not yet been banned from submitting the reports ? Or, are these all valid claims supported by sound medicine and science ? The report does not shed light on the answers to the questions. Once again, bankruptcy- related proceedings prove themselves to be the antithesis of transparency, and the Manville Data apparently remains unavailable, thus making it harder for anyone to figure out the real facts about tens of millions of dollars that perhaps should instead be available to be paid to mesothelioma claimants.

Update: The Difficulties of Managing Contingent Liabilities - Now James Hardie Is Hit with the Burden of $ 14 Million Verdict for Antitrust Violations

The Australian version of the WSJ has an interesting article by a McKinnsey consultant writing about corporate reputation risk, with the article somewhat tied back to James Hardie. An interesting read.

_________________________________________________________

Contingent liabilities are not easy to manage, as exmplified by this month's events for James Hardie. To begin with, its business is down due to the housing slump. Them its directors this month lost their trial on securities law violations regarding disclosures related to its asbestos trust, and its asbestos trust announced it is underfunded at present. Now comes the word that former subsidiaries of the the company lost a $ 14 million antitrust verdict in Chile, and that Hardie has idemnification obligations for the verdict due to terms of prior m & a transactions. According to the same article, the company has set May 20 to release numbers for its fiscal year end, which was as of March 30.


All of the above is tough enough. Now consider various other implications. One wonders, for example, whether some or all of these events have caused defaults on loan covenants for corporate financing. Even if there are no present defaults, one must wonder what its lenders will be thinking when the company next seeks access to capital or loan markets. Consider also that it will at some point probably need insurance renewals, including d & o coverage. Overall, the point is that contingent liabilities are tough to manage, and the success (or not) of risk managers may be critical to the future of a company.

Answers to FAQ's Regarding Asbestos Bankruptcies

Time to put in one place some answers to questions I'm repeatedly asked or ask myself. The list will expand over time.



1) Where are Updated Lists of Asbestos Bankruptcy Cases? Believe it or not, you can find online a very useful set of lists of asbestos bankruptcy cases, including citations to published opinions in the cases. This link will take you to this set of lists thoughtfully maintained in public view by a team of bright lawyers at Crowell & Moring. The team is led by Mark Plevin, and represents insurers in many asbestos bankruptcy cases. They kindly provide periodic updates to the lists and post them online. Just go to this page of the Crowell web site and choose the list you want.



2) Where Are Periodic Commentaries Summarizing the Status of Asbestos Bankruptcies ? The Crowell & Moring team also has published a series of five articles with expert commentary on the status of and key issues in asbestos bankruptcy cases. The articles are titled "Where Are They Now" and can be found at the same page as the bankruptcy lists. Reading these summaries provides a great, manageable lesson in how the cases and issues have evolved.



3) How Much Money Do the Asbestos Trusts Have ? This answer is harder because of course the amount keeps changing. As of November, 2006, the answer was: about $ 30 billion. That answer is set out in an excellent article by economists Charlie Bates and Charlie Mullin who lead an expert team at economic consulting firm Bates White. They know the asbestos bankruptcy topic quite thoroughly. The article's title is "Having Your Tort and Eating it Too?"


4) Is Valid Science Applied in Asbestos Bankruptcy "Liability Estimates" ? No, according to a an expert witness report submitted in the W.R. Grace asbestos bankruptcy by Dr. James Heckman, a Nobel Prize winning economist at the University of Chicago. Dr. Heckman's expert witness report is here, along with the brief of the WR Grace shareholder committee that submitted the report in support of Grace's attacks on the estimates offered by other witnesses. The report is a scathing indictment of the lack of science and reliability in the estimation process used in asbestos bankruptcies.
5) What Happened in the Federal-Mogul Bankruptcy Regarding the Efforts to Stay all Underlying Asbestos Cases Against All Friction Defendants? The answer is in this prior post.
6) Where is a Terse Summary of the Babcock & Wilcox Chapter 11 and Report of the $415 Million Settlement with Equitas? At this page of the website of Jenner & Block, counsel for the debtor.

Manville/Travelers Issues Takes on Added Importance with Expected Chrysler Chapter 11 Petiiton

The importance of the Manville/Travelers scope of jurisdiction issues will be going up if Chrysler proceeds with the expected Chapter 11 petition.

During oral argument, Justice Roberts asked, hypothetically, if the bankruptcy court could enjoin car accident claims against Travelers if such a deal were made as part of settlement of insurance coverage issues. Other justices raised questions about whether claimants would be entitled to notice before their claims are enjoined. In Chrysler, scope of injunction and notice issues could be significant, especially if assets are quickly sold off, leaving a theoretically finite set of assets to pay whatever future claims may be brought against Chrysler. It's too early to spend much time on the all the possibilities, but here are a couple of examples:

May the bankruptcy court enjoin state law tort or contract claims against Chrysler entities not in bankruptcy, if there are any? Would it matter if the injunction is part of a settlement of claims between Chrysler entities?

May the bankruptcy court enjoin state law tort claims against suppliers to Chrysler of allegedly defective products ? What about an injunction in favor of insurers of parts suppliers to Chrysler?

To which current or potential future claimants should notice be given regarding the bankruptcy or the apparently impending asset sale ?

James Hardie Judge Did Not Believe the Directors

Reading the trial judge's opinion makes it plain he did not believe the Hardie Directors when they made denials or professed a lack of memory. For summaries of key aspects of the evidence and the ruling, go here or here.

Opinion/Judgment Regarding James Hardie and Its Private Asbestos Trust

The James Hardie opinion/judgment is available here. The link also was added to the prior post containing links to the charges and a helpful summary of the outcomes.

Updated - James Hardie - Links to the Opinion/Judgment, the Charges by the AU SEC and a Tally on the Outcomes

The Australian SEC - known as ASIC - has posted on its website the charges it filed, and a document summarizing which charges were sustained and which were dismissed. All of the charges relate in one way or the other to James Hardie's contingent risks regarding asbestos claims.

Update: The opinion/judgment is available here.

James Hardie Directors Lose Charges of Securities Violations in Connection with Statements Regarding Funding of its Asbestos Trust

Not a good week for James Hardie. This week the news is that it will not fund an expected shortfall of cash in its asbestos trust, and its officers and the company lost on charges of misleading investors regarding the adequacy of its funding of its asbestos trust.

The World Today - Thursday, 23 April , 2009 12:10:00 states the following:

Reporter: Sue Lannin
PETER CAVE: In a landmark ruling a court has found that former James Hardie executives broke the Corporations Act when they claimed that a trust set up to compensate victims of asbestos-related diseases had adequate funding. The New South Wales Supreme Court has ruled that 10 company officials including the former chief executive engaged in both misleading and deceptive conduct. But not all of the civil charges brought by the corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, were proven. And in a separate twist the company says it faces a shortfall in its compensation because of the global financial crisis. Finance reporter Sue Lannin was in the court. She joins me now. Sue exactly what did the judge find?

SUE LANNIN: Well Peter the judge found that former executives and directors of James Hardie did breach sections of the company law basically by making false and misleading statements. Now that's in relation to the setting up of a fund in 2001 to compensate victims of asbestos-related diseases. In statements to the stock market and in press releases, the judge, in a press release, the judge said that the claim that that fund had adequate funding was false and misleading.Now some of those defendants include the former chief executive Peter Macdonald, former company secretary Peter Shafron and former chairwoman Meredith Hellicar. The main issue is that they've made false statements to the market or they did not disclose information to the market that there wasn't enough money in the trust fund. And also the judge found that Peter Macdonald the former chief executive made false statements to investors as part of a roadshow in Europe in 2002. As some background, James Hardie moved its corporate headquarters to the Netherlands in 2001. It set up a compensation fund. Another compensation fund had to be set up in a landmark agreement in 2004.Now some of those charges were proven, as we said, but some haven't. In relation to the roadshow, the judge found that Macdonald did make some false statements but some of the statements were not found to be false, or ASIC failed to prove its case.

PETER CAVE: Was there any reaction when the various parties emerged from the court?

SUE LANNIN: Well this has been a partial win for ASIC. I mean it's failed in previous prosecutions of high-profile cases. But even though it was a mixed victory the parties for asbestos victims who were there say it is a win. Karen Banton, the widow of asbestos campaigner Bernie Banton, said she felt vindicated. And Tanya Segelov, a lawyer for asbestos victims said it was a victory.

TANYA SEGELOV: I think it is significant. This is the first time any person connected with James Hardie has been held to have engaged in unlawful conduct. And while ASIC didn't succeed on all its claims, we have a finding that former directors, former executives, the former company and the current company were engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct and were in breach of the Corporations Act.

PETER CAVE: Tanya Segelov there. When will the penalties be handed down?

SUE LANNIN: Well that's still a date to be set by the judge but it will be later this year and certainly lawyers for the defendants will be arguing their case. Now there's also a, the judge said that, made a judgement that the board in 2001 did approve a press release that contained false and misleading statements in regards to the adequacy of the compensation fund so the judge is still to rule on that.He also, as I said, has to rule on what the penalties will be. Now the former company officials and directors face fines of up to $200,000 and they could also be disqualified from running a company. But several of those former directors are still running companies, including Meredith Hellicar, the former chairwoman. She's currently a director of AMP.

PETER CAVE: Thank you Sue Lannin, just back from the court.

James Hardie Judgment Due Today Regarding Criminal Prosecution and Asbestos Expense Disclosures - AU Time

Press reports indicate that a judgment is due out later today regarding the Australian "SEC"s criminal prosecution of directors of James Hardie regarding disclosures with respect to its asbestos-laibilities and the private trust it created to seek to resolve personal injury claims.

Asbestos Litigation Data - Navigant Database

This post follows up on a prior post that described the Manville asbestos trust halting its prior practice of licensing its claims data to third parties for uses such as estimating future claim counts, seeing evidence of claiming trends, and weeding out fraudulent claims.

After the original post, I heard two sets of comments through emails, phone calls and personal conversations. First, I heard multiple comments that fall into the general category of complaints that the Manville data cutbacks are exacerbating an already difficult claims management situation arising from the absence of verifiable public data on asbestos claim payments.

Second, I heard from professionals at Navigant regarding a database of asbestos claims it is licensing to users, and its ongoing efforts to expand the scope of the database. Navigant is the name of a consulting firm that today is home for scores of professionals with massive asbestos experience. Navigant's data and professionals have roots in extensive work for insurers and insureds on asbestos claims as the claim morphed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I'm happy to give its database a bit of a plug here because I know from personal experience that Navigant's professionals do lots of great work on asbestos claims. Indeed, back in the 1980s, I worked with several of their professionals (then at Peterson & Co.) on the dinosaur known as "asbestos-in-buildings" claims. (That species of asbestos claims long ago became extinct in the tort system due to lack of merit, but - incredibly - those claims still live on in the alternative universe of asbestos trusts. Why that is so is a story for another day. )

Marketing material for the Navigant database is available here. The gist is that the database includes a variety of useful data, with two subsets that are especially valuable. One subset consists of all mesothelioma lawsuits filed in the United States beginning in 2005. The data can be organized by state and in time sequence. These are powerful tools to evaluate the scope of recent mesothelioma claims, which today are the claims driving the majority of the costs for asbestos defendants and/or insurers. The database also identifies the entities named as defendants in each case, and to the extent available from the complaint, the nature of the plaintiff's trade and alleged dates of asbestos exposure. This information also is highly useful for assessing the relative role of a particular defendant as compared to others, and for assessing insurance issues tied to exposure date allegations.

Navigant's Brad Drew and others are responsible for the database, and tell me they are working on trying to expand the database through cooperative efforts among defendants and others. Hopefully they succeed in the far less than simple task of herding together decision-makers and information from the key players among the thousands of asbestos defendants. (Once upon a time back in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the plaintiffs were at a disadvantage because the relatively limited set of defendants and insurers actually worked pretty well together to share claims data and war stories. That stopped being true as more and more of the original original defendants fell into bankruptcy and the number of defendants exponentially expanded as plaintiff's lawyers and experts started selling the notion that even the tiniest "exposure" constitutes a "cause" of disease.)

The Navigant database also includes hundreds of thousands of old asbestos claims assembled over the many years that Navigant has been processing claims for insurers and defendants. This data also can be very valuable for estimating claims, perceiving trends and proving up facts regarding the "elephantine mass' of asbestos claims. Old claims also may be used to find fraudulent multiple claims by one person.

It's great that Navigant is making this data available. That said, it seems incongruous that there is no free, national database of objective data regarding asbestos litigation.

19 States File Amicus Brief to Oppose Broad Preemptive Orders Issued By Asbestos Bankruptcy Courts - GIT Case

This post follows up on the amicus brief mentioned in yesterday's post regarding the GIT asbestos chapter 11 case that is set for oral argument on May 20 in the Third Circuit.

19 state AGs filed an amicus brief in the GIT case to urge the 3rd Circuit to block the efforts of the debtor and the asbestos and silica plaintiff's bar to use bankruptcy court preemption powers to give asbestos and silica claimants exclusive access to GIT's insurance policies. The AG's brief explains that the 19 states are concerned because their states may be claimants in environmental cases seeking damages from GIT. In their view, bankruptcy court orders should not preclude states from seeking monies from GIT insurance policies that otherwise should be available to pay damages. the states might win. In other words, the tiny number of silica claims described in yesterday's post, plus asbestos claims, should not be be used to ordinary preempt state law and should not leave the asbestos and silica personal injury claimants with exclusive access to insurance policy proceeds generated from GIT insurance policies.

The amicus brief explains in detail why that result is bad policy, and join with the insurers in attacking the broad preemption powers that the bankruptcy court purported to exercise under bankruptcy code section 1123. According to the amici, the conclusion of the lower courts is "extremely dangerous" because it allows bankruptcy court to become a "haven for wrongdoers."

The amicus brief is well worth reading in its entirety, and is available at the end of the compilation of GIT briefs available here. The following sets out some full text from the amicus brief, at 2-4, in order to provide a taste of intensity of the 19 states that disagree with the broad preemption result sought by the debtor and the asbestos and silica claimants:


"The conclusion of the bankruptcy and the district courts herein - that the opening phrase in Section 1123(a), "Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law to the contrary," does impose such a broad preemptive effect -is deeply flawed in that it reads that language without any historical context, and without any attempt to harmonize that language with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code. And, by reaching that conclusion, the lower courts have created a situation by which an entity can use bankruptcy to escape from all regulatory authority if it can convince a bankruptcy court that doing so would allow it to implement its plan.

Such a result would fly in the face of the oft-repeated axiom that bankruptcy is not meant to be a "haven for wrongdoers." 1 Collier Bankruptcy Man. P 362.04 at 362-23 (4th ed. 1980); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy P 362.04 at 362-36 (15th ed. 1980) as cited by Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429, 439 fn. 16 (5th Cir. 1981) and numerous other circuit courts thereafter. It is certainly the case that many valid laws create operating difficulties for those who do not wish to follow their strictures. The Code, though, does not allow a debtor to flout those requirements during the case. Sections 362(b)(1) and (4), for example, except governmental criminal and civil regulatory actions from the automatic stay; 28 U.S.C. 959(b) requires debtors to obey the laws of the states with respect to the property of the estate during the case; and 28 U.S.C. 1452(a) bars debtors from removing regulatory actions to bankruptcy court from the state courts in which they are pending. Yet, under the interpretation espoused below, those constraints disappear as soon as the debtor proposes a plan under which it asserts that it needs to avoid the restrictions in order to successfully reorganize.

Such a reading of this language would destroy the Amici States' ability to preserve their regulatory authority in the face of a bankruptcy filing. It could allow a debtor to propose and confirm a plan with terms that provide for anything from ignoring the limits on charitable conversions, to barring enforcement of clean-up obligations for contaminated property that it retains post-petition, to denying state consumer protection agencies the ability to bar the debtor from continuing methods of operations that are unfair and deceptive and violate state law. The Amici States do not believe that any such result could possibly have been contemplated by Congress in adding this language to Section 1123 in 1984 as a "technical amendment." (see discussion below, pp. 15-17). They file this brief to urge this court to reverse the decisions below and find that the appropriate scope of preemption under Section 1123 is far narrower than that stated in the decisions at issue and, properly read, does not bar appellants from raising their substantive arguments. The Amici States are not concerned with the final outcome of that substantive litigation, and take no position on the merits of the insurers' antiassignment defense; their only concern is with the extremely dangerous consequences of the means by which the lower courts arrived at the conclusion that insurers are barred from even raising those issues. (footnotes omitted)."

More on Manville/Travelers and Another Asbestos Bankruptcy Appeal - The GIT Case in the Third Circuit Set for Oral Argument in May

The Travelers/Manville case pending before the Supreme Court is only one of the asbestos Chapter 11 cases pending in federal appellate courts. This post deals with yet another such case, In Re Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. (GIT), an appeal pending in the Third Circuit; with oral argument scheduled for May 20, 2009. Like Travelers/Manville,the GIT case has generated a telling nonpartisan amicus brief, and focuses attention on fact patterns that illustrate why mass tort bankruptcy injunctions have been allowed to go too far by rulings that block effective challenges to the plan by would-be objectors. The amicus brief and opening appellate briefs from the insurers are collected here.

GIT Issues and Arguments by Hartford

GIT presents multiple significant issues raised by insurers of GIT that seek to overturn the confirmed plan. Hartford raises perhaps the most interesting issues. One is its assertions is, in essence, that asbestos claims were used as an improper excuse for the bankruptcy court to issue an unnecessary and unconstitutional section 105 injunction at the behest of plaintiff's lawyers to create an unneeded "silica trust" to pay allegedly fraudulent silica claims. Hartford argues that the lower courts rubber-stamped the silica trust and injunction as "necessary" after the lower courts held that Hartford and other insurers lacked standing to object to the plan. According to Hartford, the silica trust is in reality "a scheme to use the bankruptcy process to generate .... dubious or fraudulent silica-related claims, to hand Debtors' insurers the bill for those claims, and to deprive insurers of defenses to coverage arising from that very scheme." Hartford Brief at 1.

To support its argument, Hartford musters various proofs, three of which are compelling both individually and collectively. Hartford's points are summarized immediately below with citations to the brief. Extended quotes from the brief are set out at the bottom of this text.

First, Hartford points out that the plan only enjoins silica claims arising from alleged "exposures" prior to a certain date (the date the chapter 11 petition was filed), and thus the plan leaves GIT liable to pay all silica claims arising from later exposures. Hartford Brief at n. 7. It certainly does seem illogical to argue that it's "necessary" to resolve only some but not all of a set of potential future claims.

Second, Hartford points out that the "silica trust" is not funded by the debtor, and instead is to be funded only by monies paid out from some $ 500 million of GIT insurance policies that contain "asbestos exclusions." The asbestos exclusions render the policies unable to pay asbestos claims. Hartford Brief at 9-10. As Hartford argues, it certainly is illogical to argue in an asbestos bankruptcy that is "necessary" to resolve silica claims to be paid from insurance policies that can not be used to pay asbestos claims.

Third, Hartford contrasts silica claiming facts before the chapter 11 petition was filed to the silica claiming facts after the petition was filed. Prior to the petition, GIT had been sued in less than 200 silica cases, GIT had not paid out any money on silica claims, and its insurers had only paid out $ 312,000 for silica claims. Hartford Brief at 8. In contrast, after the petition was filed, silica claims were soon submitted in droves (over 4,500). As Hartford points out, the sudden spate of claims was a win-win for everyone but the insurers since the spate of claims gave GIT votes needed to approve its plan under section 524(g), and payments by the trust on the claims would over time generate money for claimants and their lawyers, with the claims judged by the trust under a limp "proof" standard. Hartford Brief at 9-14. Thus, everyone would be happy except the insurers called on to pay the silica claims after approval by the trust.

Lessons from GIT for Manville/Travelers

At least two points may be drawn from the facts regarding the silica trust and the use of the GIT insurance policies for silica claims but not asbestos claims. One point is that the facts of the silica trust situation should be tested against the Travelers/Manville hypothetical question posed by Justice Roberts. He asked whether an asbestos chapter 11 court could issue an injunction to resolve "traffic accident" claims if the insurer maintained that resolving the traffic accidents were "necessary" for it to agree to the resolution of the asbestos claims. Plainly the hypothetical ordinarily should be answered: "no," if bankruptcy power is to have any limits, absent a detailed and explicit record proving actual necessity, with the record having been subject to meaningful testing by an actual adversary. (Such a record does not appear to exist in Travelers/Manville.) Otherwise, the parties agreement that a deal is "necessary" will bind the hands of the bankruptcy court, and will give the debtor and friends control over the use of federal bankruptcy court power. Consider also that the injunction issued in GIT is even less defensible as "necessary" because the injunction was issued over the objection of the insurer, thus meaning that the only "necessity" arose from the debtor and the plaintiff's lawyers agreeing on a deal that cost them nothing.

The facts of GIT also prove that chapter 11 cases can be completed, and deals can and will be reached between debtors and personal injury plaintiff's lawyers, even without agreement from insurers. Thus, the deal disproves Travelers naked assertion that chapter 11 cases will be concluded only if insurer are given relief that extends far beyond claims tightly derivative of claims against the debtor. Note further that GIT was willing to leave itself exposed to some but not all potential future silica claims, thus disproving Travelers' arguments that bankruptcies can end only if there is "finality" on all tort claims.

A future post will address the amicus brief, and the response briefs from the plan proponents.

Set out below are longer quotes from Hartford's brief.
________________

As to Hartford's point regarding the injunction being unnecessary because it only covers some but all future silica claims, Hartford's brief states the following:

"Under the plan, silica claims against A.P. Green based on exposure prior to the petition date will be channeled to the silica trust. JA119, JA892. Claims based on post-petition exposure will ride through the bankruptcy and become the responsibility of the reorganized Debtors. JA65, JA119, JA137." Hartford Brief at n.7.

Hartford's other two points are presented in the following text from pages 1, 7-14, with omissions as indicated by ellipses and stars:

In recent years, plaintiffs' lawyers have flooded the courts with dubious or
outright fraudulent claims of silica-related injury. As the district judge presiding over the silica multidistrict litigation described such claims: "[T]hese diagnoses were driven by neither health nor justice: they were manufactured for money." In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (Jack, J.) This case centers on a scheme to use the bankruptcy process to generate similarly dubious or fraudulent silica-related claims, to hand Debtors' insurers the bill for those claims, and to deprive insurers of defenses to coverage arising from that very scheme. Hartford Brief at 1.

***

Debtor A.P. Green Industries, Inc., a Missouri corporation founded in 1915,
manufactures and sells refractory products--construction materials used in high temperature environments.... Before the mid-1970s, several of the refractory products manufactured and sold by A.P. Green allegedly contained asbestos. Certain plaintiffs sued A.P. Green, claiming injury from exposure to those products. JA820. As of the bankruptcy filing in 2002, A.P. Green had paid approximately $448 million to resolve more than 200,000 asbestos-related claims, and an additional 235,000 asbestos-related claims were pending. JA820-821.

A.P. Green's experience with silica was another story entirely. As of the
bankruptcy filing, there was exactly one lawsuit pending against A.P. Green,in Texas state court, consisting of claims by 169 individuals for bodily injury caused by silica-containing products. JA106, JA1011. Including those 169 claims, Debtors identified fewer than 200 claims asserted against A.P. Green for silica related injury in the 25 years before the bankruptcy. JA106. In those 25 years, A.P. Green never paid any of its own money on account of silica claims, and its primary insurer had paid only $312,000 to resolve such claims. JA106-107. Hartford Brief at 7-8.

B. Debtors' Bankruptcy Filings And Plan

In February 2002, GIT and certain of its subsidiaries, including A.P. Green,
filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. JA763-770. Debtors sought bankruptcy
protection not to address silica liability, but to address "adverse business
conditions" and "to deal with the overwhelming number of asbestos liability
lawsuits and claims pending against them." JA117; see also JA780 (Debtors filed for bankruptcy due to "the costs of asbestos litigation," a "deterioration of general business conditions," and an inability "to secure working capital financing").

In order to confirm a plan of reorganization that would resolve that
"overwhelming" asbestos liability, Debtors needed the approval of 75% of the
asbestos claimants, and thus needed to reach a deal with plaintiffs' lawyers.
See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that "[t]he realities of securing favorable votes from thousands of claimants to meet the 75% approvalrequirement forces debtors to work closely" with plaintiffs' lawyers). In the course of negotiating that deal, Debtors determined that they had nearly $500 million in potential insurance coverage that did not cover asbestos claims (generally because of express asbestos exclusions, which became typical provisions in liability policies in the 1980s) but that, in their view, was available to cover silica claims. JA823. Accordingly, Debtors and asbestos plaintiffs' counsel (many of whom also represented persons asserting silica claims against other companies) agreed upon a plan that included not just an asbestos trust and channeling injunction, but a silica trust and channeling injunction as well. JA2891, JA2893.7 Debtors and plaintiffs' counsel also negotiated the Trust Distribution Procedures--the terms under which the silica trust would evaluate and pay claims. JA2968-3031. In addition, Debtors agreed with plaintiffs' counsel that the Trust Advisory Committee and the Future Claims Representative--that is, many of the persons in charge of operating the trust and overseeing the evaluation and payment of silica claims--would be lawyers representing the interests of alleged silica claimants. JA1332-1404. Debtors are making no contribution of their own funds to the silica trust, which will be funded entirely by insurance. JA2894-2895. The trust is to receive $35.5 million in proceeds from several insurance settlements. In addition, A.P. Green will assign to the trust its rights under its insurance policies with asbestos exclusions, including policies issued by Appellants. JA892, JA2894-2895,
JA3037.

After agreeing with plaintiffs' counsel to structure the plan to include the silica trust, Debtors actively sought out claimants to support the plan. Having virtually no silica claimants of their own, Debtors obtained a list of silica claimants from another company's bankruptcy and solicited votes for their plan from counsel for those claimants (many of whom were the same firms representing asbestos claimants against Debtors). JA1466-1469. Ultimately, 5,125 votes were cast on behalf of persons with alleged silica claims against Debtors. JA1412. The bulk of these votes were submitted by a handful of law firms via master ballots. JA1417. Indeed, one law firm, the Provost Umphrey Law Firm, accounted for over half the votes. JA1334. Hartford Brief at 7-11.

[Brief describes Judge Jack's Silica MDL opinion finding fraud in silica claiming, and brief describes resulting tort reform legislation] These developments, combined with a review of the supplemental submissions in this case, leave little doubt that most of the claims asserted by the 5,125 silica claimants who voted on the plan are invalid. Over half the claimants who submitted supplemental forms were diagnosed by doctors whose diagnoses were rejected as fraudulent by Judge Jack. JA2074. In addition, over half the claimants had previously filed asbestos-related claims or been diagnosed with an asbestos-related disease, JA2159--making it extremely unlikely that they also had a legitimate silica-related claim. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 603; see also JA1431 (Decl. of David Weill) (noting the near impossibility of a Case: 08-3650 Document: 00312869189 Page: 23 Date Filed: 12/04/2008 person's contracting both an asbestos-related and a silica-related disease in a working lifetime). Fully 82% of the claims bore at least one of these markers of fraud. JA2159. Hartford Brief at 13-14.

Link to Transcript from Oral Argument in Travelers/Manville Asbestos Bankruptcy Case

The oral argument transcript is availble here.

Mass Tort Bankruptcies - Key Issues Raised Today in SCOTUS in the Travelers/Manville Asbestos Bankruptcy

Updated: An April 6 blog entry by Alison Frankel includes a letter from Cozen O'Conner responding to Mr. Ostrager.

Today's oral argument date in the Supreme Court for the Travelers/Manville case has drawn some massive hyperbole in a blog article. The article quotes Travelers' counsel, Barry Ostrager, as saying that the case is very important, but that one of his opponents, Chubb Insurance Company, has received the worst legal advice "ever" in arguing its position. It's true the case may have a massive impact on the use of bankruptcy court as a means to resolve "mass tort" litigation. As for the quality of the legal advice provided to Chubb by Jack Cohn, consider that an estimable group of bankruptcy and constitutional law professors disagree with Mr. Ostrager, and explained why in an excellent amicus brief that is available here for no cost through the SCOTUS wiki and the ABA's efforts to put SCOTUS briefs online.

The Travelers issue boils down to whether a bankruptcy court can issue a national (global?) injunction that bars any and all future claims against an insurer of the debtor after the insurer has paid money to settle coverage claims brought by the debtor. In my view, the correct answer is: no, for a variety of reasons. The main reason? Such a sweeping injunctive order is improper for a variety of reasons. The principal flaw is that government action that improperly takes away property rights (legal claims against the insurer) of third parties, and takes the claims away without providing a meaningful prior hearing or payment of just compensation, thereby violating the 5th amendment rights of the persons whose claims are extinguished.

I argued many of the same issues last year in the Federal-Mogul asbestos bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court judge, Judith Fitzgerald, has heard many of the asbestos bankruptcies pursuant to an appoint met order by the Third Circuit. She did not reach all the issues but did apply the "derivative" standard that is at issue in the Travelers/Manville case. There, in a September 30. 2008 opinion, Judge Fitzgerald blocked an effort to expand bankruptcy court jurisdiction. See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3517. I've frequently disagreed with Judge Fitzgerald, but she ruled correctly in this instance and her ruling also supports Chubb/Jack Cohn. And, for what it's worth, I also agree with Chubb and Jack Cohn.


As always, please bear in mind my standard disclosure: I have in the past and do now represent non-insurer parties opposed to certain terms of asbestos bankruptcies, and also have represented and do represent entities that are defendants in or financially tied to asbestos litigation through indemnity obligations or shared insurance. Further specifics are available on my bio at my law firm's website (http://www.butlerrubin.com/) or feel free to email me at work if you need further information. .

American Plaintiff's Lawyers Seeking New Markets Target Global Shipyards for Claiming, Including Claiming Against US Asbestos Trusts

Are American lawyers going abroad to seek out new asbestos claimants? Of course they are. Like any business person, they are seeking new markets.

Shipyards in Europe provide concrete examples. In particular, a March 24, 2009 article describes an American plaintiff's lawyer, Mitchell Cohen, speaking to shipyards workers in Malta, with the group apparently having been assembled the GRW trade union. According to the article, Mr. Cohen was talking about making claims against US asbestos trusts. Likewise, a 2004 article describes Mr. Cohen having been in Spain to speaking to and handing out settlement checks from US asbestos trusts to persons who worked on US Navy vessels in Rota, Spain.

Why shipyards? Shipyards anywhere in the world are great sources for asbestos claiming due to widespread use of asbestos during shipbuilding, including signficant use of the highly toxic amphibole fibers. Indeed, much of America's asbestos claiming arose from shipyards. Now, the claiming pattern is being repeated with claimants from shipyards around the globe seeking to file lawsuits and claims against asbestos trusts established in the US through Chapter 11 proceedings.

Update - Manville Trust Explains Actions Regarding Not Collecting Social Security Numbers from Claimants

A prior post on this blog (Friday March 6, 2008) provided information regarding the Manville Trust 1) reducing data available from the trust and 2) ending its requirement that claimants submit social security numbers. The Trust's CRMC administrator has now advised that the reason it dropped the social security number requirement was to comply with an opinion from legal counsel, with the opinion apparently focused on persons who work in the United States without a social security number (which to me would seem to be "illegal aliens.") His email also states that "product identification" evidence is required from the claimant, that duplicate checking is performed at the Manville Trust, and that three such claims have been filed to date.
So, that's an interesting explanation. Now the question is: will the Manville Trust return to its prior practice of licensing its data to outside experts and disclosing country-specific data regarding "foreign" claims. so that they use as it as in the past.

Note also that the CRMC website no longer contains the previously posted notice regarding social security numbers. The website instead now has a notice that explains the policy change in more detail - it states the following:

"Updated on 11/11/08
--- The Manville Trust changed its policy with respect to requiring a SSN for claimants exposed in the United States. This position was based on a legal opinion that individuals without SSN's who were exposed to Johns-Manville asbestos in the United States may file a claim against the Trust. This can occur in unusual instances, such as when a claimant is a foreign citizen who worked temporarily in the United States. Claimants in such circumstances are subject to increased evidentiary requirements to support their asbestos exposure allegations. If you are an electronic filer you will receive a notice via the message board indicating that a MV-Exposure Document is required. Examples of evidence that would be sufficient for meeting this requirement would include: work history records, deposition materials, affidavits, etc. Furthermore, claimant duplicate checking continues using the claimant's first name, middle initial, last name and date of birth. "

__________________________________________________________________


The specifics of the communications were as follows.

I followed up on the March 6, 2009 blog entry by sending an email to the trust with the link to the blog entry regarding the trust's changes. Mr. Garelick, counsel for CRMC, responded with a March 10 email (full text pasted below) providing additional information on the trust's action regarding social security numbers.

___________________________________________________________________

Dear Mr. Hartley,

Thank you for bringing to my attention your March 6, 2009 blog entry regarding Manville Trust claims data. I believe you misunderstood the reason for, and impact of, the Trust's recent policy change regarding submission of claimant Social Security numbers ("SSNs").

In November of 2008, the Manville Trust changed its policy with respect to requiring an SSN for claimants exposed in the United States. This position was based on a legal opinion that individuals without SSN's who were exposed to Johns-Manville asbestos in the United States may file claims against the Trust. This can occur in unusual instances, such as when a claimant is a foreign citizen who worked temporarily in the United States. Claimants in such circumstances are subject to increased evidentiary requirements to support their asbestos exposure allegations.

When such a claim is filed, the law firm filing on behalf of the claimant, or the claimant, is required to provide evidence to the Trust of exposure to Johns-Manville asbestos in the United States. If the documentation is approved the claim is processed accordingly. Examples of evidence that would be sufficient for meeting this requirement would include: work history records, deposition materials, affidavits, etc. Furthermore, claimant duplicate checking continues using the claimant's first name, middle initial, last name and date of birth. To date, three (3) claims have been filed without SSNs.

--Jared Garelick
Jared S. Garelick
Senior Attorney
Claims Resolution Managment Corporation (CRMC)
3110 Fairview Park Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 12003
Falls Church, VA 22042-0683
Tel. (703) 205-0836
Fax (703) 205-6248