Long Tail Torts, Insurers, Insureds and Schemes of Arrangement - Scottish Lion

A scheme of arrangement is a UK term that applies to a variety of legal proceedings, including proceedings in which a solvent insurer seeks to end its operations - for its convenience - and to put an end to the life of insurance policies that pay claims based on an "occurrence." Occurrence policies have cost insurers billions of dollars paying for underlying asbestos claims.

Insurers like such schemes because they can shut down operations and seek to end their life without waiting for all claims to mature/occur/manifest. In general, schemes are disfavored by insureds that sold products that may produce long-tail injuries. Why ? Because they paid for long term coverage but the scheme ends the coverage before all claims may have manifested themselves.

In a recent scheme in Scotland, the trial court had to consider these issues in a scheme proposed by Scottish Lion. Here is a summary of the Red Lion opposition from the law firm - Covington & Burling - that opposed the scheme for its insured clients. Is that a winning rationale ? Stay tuned for the answer.

Internationalization of Antitrust Law

This post from the Conglomerate blog brings together some interesting source materials on the internationalization of antitrust law.

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Asbestos - UK - Update on Various Topics

I'm headed to London this weekend to chair an asbestos litigation conference starting On Tuesday the 29th, so this seems a good time for an update on new speakers added to the conference roster and on some UK developments regarding asbestos litigation.

Conference Update: Two additional conference speakers have been added. One speaker will address new research regarding the impact of the chapter 11 asbestos trusts in the United States. Some of the research data was released in the US earlier this month and quite explicitly proves that indeed the chapter 11 bankruptcies have a significant impact on the litigation fortunes of the defendants that remain in the tort system. The research was undertaken by Bates White and will be presented by Peter Kelso. Additional upcoming research on asbestos bankruptcies also will be discussed.

Another speaker was added to address the evolving topic of litigation as a target of investors. Litigation investment will be addressed in two ways. First, Selvyn Seidel of Burford Advisors will explain the nature of the business and how and why it is expanding. Second, additional speaker Andrew Evans will describe the emerging market in which defendant companies may pay other companies to take over some or all litigation risks in, for example, asbestos litigation. Mr. Evans is part of a business known as Litigation Resources Group that has its roots in Bates White work on the economic realities of asbestos litigation.



Conference registration is still open at the online site here. The conference runs all day on Tuesday the 29th and a half-day on Wednesday the 30th. I'm speaking on the 30th as part of a panel on asbestos trusts.



Pleural Plaques: Trade unions in the UK this week started ratcheting back up their efforts to persuade the UK government to enact legislation that would reinstate damages claims for pleural plaques. This September 24 article from the UK asserts that the unions expect "betrayal":

"Unions will again call on the Government to restore compensation for pleural plaques sufferers at the Labour Party Conference next week.

Gordon Brown was presented with a campaign video produced for the Trade Union and Labour Party Liaison Organisation by Jim Kennedy, political officer of construction union UCATT, this week.

Unions are demanding a new law to overturn the Law Lords' 2007 decision that sufferers of the asbestos-related disease do not need compensation.

Mr Brown promised the TUC Congress that ministers would examine the question when Parliament returns. But UCATT warned earlier this year that they were expecting "betrayal" on the issue"

Asbestos in Schools Hysteria in the UK: Hard to believe the way asbestos-in-schools history is now repeating itself in the UK via essentially hysterical UK news articles that fail to take any lessons from like prior hysteria in the US. Thus, this article from the UK's Mirror newspaper rather hysterically reports that 50,000 law suits are expected against uninsured UK school councils for allegedly causing asbestos-related disease. The article states:


"Test case may lead to 1000s of asbestos compensation claims


By Mark Ellis 23/09/2009
A test case may open the floodgates to thousands of compensation claims for asbestos-related cancers, a court heard yesterday.
And it could create a massive financial burden on education budgets for generations to come.
The warning comes amid fears that many comprehensive schools built in the 60s are riddled with the potentially lethal material.
It also adds weight to the Mirror's Asbestos Timebomb campaign. Lord Justice Moses at London's civil appeal court heard that 50,000 cases against largely uninsured councils are expected over the next 40 years.

And he set the stage for a landmark ruling by allowing council chiefs at Knowsley, Merseyside, to appeal a £240,000 award.
The case involves Dianne Willmore, 49, who blames her time as a pupil for her incurable lung cancer.
Asbestos timebomb: For more information on the Daily Mirror's campaign visit our blog."


UK reporters actually interested in facts and reality would do well to take lessons from the US experience. Asbestos-in-buildings hysteria swept the United States in the 1980s as EPA and plaintiff's lawyers predicted waves of deaths of janitors and school teachers, and thousands of lawsuits arising from injuries to be attributed to the presence of asbestos in school buildings. Ultimately, the hysteria ended because defendants W. R. Grace, U.S. Gypsum and National Gypsum gathered and analyzed literally tens of thousands of air samples in school buildings. The samples were analyzed and evaluated by world-class experts, including Rich Lee and Morton Corn (Dr. Corn earlier was a highly senior OSHA official and oversaw a dramatic but thoughtful reduction in the PELs for asbestos) . Their peer reviewed articles and testimony ultimately stemmed the tide of hysteria because they proved that in most but not all instances, the indoor air in schools contained no more asbestos fibers than did outdoor air. They also proved that even if fibers are being released in a certain spot in the building, the fiber levels a few feet away are still normal. Morton Corn proved this by, among other things, using air sampling to monitor fiber levels at various points in a room in which he was using a baseball bat to strike an asbestos-containing ceiling material.

Meanwhile, asbestos-in-buildings lawsuits at first flourished in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s but then faded away hen the plaintiff's bar realized that the cases were very hard to win and expensive to litigate. Indeed, my then-partner Pat Lamb and I went to trial for W.R. Grace back in 1995 on asbestos-in-buildings claims brought by the Chicago Board of Education and numerous suburban school districts. After several days of trial, the claims settled for a very modest fraction of the demand.



Today, asbestos-in-buildings claims do not exist in the US except in the non real world of chapter 11 cases where science and state law are routinely ignored. Why? Because Congress' section 524(g) gives economic power to claims that lack merit by giving claimants votes the debtors need to exit chapter 11, thus leading debtors to pay money to settle claims that plaintiff's do not in fact bring or win in state courts. This pattern once again highlights that chapter 11 decision-making for tort claims is seldom grounded in reality.

Quigley/Pfizer Asbestos Bankruptcy Trial Underway and Highlights Deep Flaws in the Chapter 11 Process as It Relates to Mass Tort Claims

This article from Bloomberg describes the start of the confirmation trial in the Pfizer/Quigley asbestos bankruptcy and reviews the case in general. The trial is to run off and on for 7 or more trial days, concluding Oct. 16.

Despite various efforts to paint the situation in other lights, Quigley essentially is a corporate shell doing nothing but running off tort claims, so the relevance/applicability of chapter 11 is not apparent. Indeed, according to Bloomberg, " Edward Weisfelner, a lawyer for asbestos victims, challenged precedents set by asbestos cases in the 1980s. said of this case, "We are allowing the Chapter 11 process to be rented out, for the benefit of the true economic party of interest," Weisfelner told Bernstein, calling the case a "sham," by Pfizer that abuses the bankruptcy code. He said the bankruptcy, which has cost $75 million over five years, was filed solely to protect Pfizer. The US Trustee's office also has raised issues on this topic, which is notable because that office has not done much in most of the asbestos-driven chapter 11 cases. In short, one key issue is the extent to which a parent company can pay money and obtain in exchange a bankruptcy court injunction to protect itself against future asbestos claims arising from its relationship to the subsidiary and/or its actions related to the subsidiary. Some procedural issues cloud what the bankruptcy court will and will not do in terms of ruling on those issues.

Also interesting will be the process of estimating the value of future claims. As I've described before here (see item 4) the chapter 11 "estimation" process used in mass tort cases was the subject of scathing criticism in the W. R. Grace asbestos bankruptcy case. The criticism took the form of a declaration by a Nobel prize winning economist, Dr. James Heckman. As he explains it, the estimation process is not even close to scientific and instead is far more about trying to predict the future claiming practices of plaintiff's lawyers based on what the lawyers did in the past. That of course brings to mind the usual investment fund disclosure that past performance is not a predictor of the future, a statement that surely is equally true for the claiming practices of plaintiff's lawyers. According to Professor Heckman, courts should not allow themselves to be used to make a ruling based on estimates built in part around the massive asbestos claiming frauds that Professor Brickman and others have described at length.

The Quigley/Pfizer case also somewhat addresses the reality that in some limited ways, some asbestos plaintiff's lawyers representing some cancer claimants are in some ways contesting the usual approach to asbestos chapter 11 cases because it gives far too much power to the lawyers representing the least sick claimants (if they are sick at all, in the every day sense of the word). This case is thus another part of the occasionally public intramural disputes between different asbestos plaintiff's lawyers, with the two basic camps composed of 1) firms that represent thousands of minimally sick claimants and 2) firms that represent relative handfuls of cancer claimants.

Another public example of those disputes occurred back when some plaintiff's lawyers went to Congress during the days of the so-called FAIR Act and testified about the deep flaws in the thousands of claims being mass-filed on behalf of persons who were at most minimally sick.

Another public indicator of the battle may be found in the chapter 11 trusts which include terms that impose "collars" (limits) on the amount of money that may be paid out in a given year to the least sick claimants.

The intramural battle between camps of plaintiff's lawyer goes on because Congress irrationally handed huge economic power to lawyers for the minimally sick when it enacted section 524(g) of the bankruptcy code. Economic power was created by including a term that requires a vote in favor of the chapter 11 plan by 75% of ALL asbestos claimants. That rule has been under some attack in this case as the lawyers for cancer claimants seek to reduce the value of the votes of the least sick claimants.

The same economic dispute between the cancer claimants and the minimally sick also applies to future personal injury claimants. However, the inherent and obvious conflict between these two subsets of future claimants is typically ignored in chapter 11 cases. How is the conflict ignored? By assigning one person the impossible task of trying to properly represent all future personal injury claimants.













United States to Limit Use of the State Secrets Privilege for Civil Litigation ?

This September 23 NYT article by Charlie Savage describes Obama administration plans to deploy rules that limit the use of the state secrets privilege to block civil litigation. The article also briefly discusses legislative efforts to limit invocation of the privilege.

The existing use of privilege has significantly limited past lawsuits. For an example, see this prior post from this blog regarding civil claims against Saudi entities regarding the September 11 attacks. Make sure to click through to the linked NYT article and its internal links.

Key excerpts follow from the recent article:

Under the new policy, if an agency like the National Security Agency or the Central Intelligence Agency wanted to block evidence or a lawsuit on state secrets grounds, it would present an evidentiary memorandum describing its reasons to the assistant attorney general for the division handling the lawsuit in question.

If that official recommended approving the request, it would be sent on to a review committee made up of high-level Justice Department officials, and then to Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden and Mr. Holder. All those officials would be charged with deciding whether the disclosure of information would risk "significant harm" to national security, and they would be instructed to seek a way to avoid shutting down the entire lawsuit if possible.

If the Justice Department signed off on asserting the privilege, the head of the agency controlling the information would sign a classified memorandum to be filed with a court explaining in detail the government's reasoning. A judge could request access to particular pieces of underlying evidence.

The policy is silent on whether the government would comply, and officials said such requests would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. One of the controversies surrounding the privilege is that sometimes judges accept executive assertions about classified evidence without independently examining it.

Will There Soon Be Another Chapter 11 Tort Claim Trust for Chinese Drywall Claims Against an Insolvent Builder, Perhaps With Insurers Involved ?

This summer brought the Chrysler and GM chapter 11 cases in which bankruptcy courts issued wide-ranging injunctions that seek to block some or all tort claimants from pursuing some or all current and/or future tort claims against the insolvent entities and their successors and/or buyers. Now, as we move into fall, here's the latest example of the expanding use of chapter 11 injunctions and trust funds as the proposed means to resolve underlying alleged "mass tort" claims. These ongoing expansions make it even more important to scrutinize the rules to the process by which Wall Street is now able to use chapter 11 to eliminate or transfer financial responsibility for underlying mass tort claims. These ongoing expansions also make plain that there is a pressing need to pull down the veil of secrecy that blocks meaningful scrutiny of the operations of most, if not all, chapter 11 trust funds that resolve tort claims.

This latest example arises from this new motion filed in the Tousa home builder bankruptcy. The effort in Tousa parallels the approach taken in the WCI home builder chapter 11 case. The new motion in Tousa seek to continue the automatic stay to block tort and contract claims regarding buildings built with allegedly defective Chinese drywall. The motion seeks to continue to block the underlying lawsuits based on the prospect of creating a chapter 11 trust to resolve the same underlying lawsuits. Presumably the trust also would be used to resolve the claims that would arise if the court were to allow a proposed class action against Tousa by would-be drywall claimants . The proposed class action is the subject of other bankruptcy court motions.

The motion in Tousa is noteworthy for multiple reasons. For one, it asserts that the debtor will welcome the involvement of its insurers in creating the proposed trust. In contrast, in the asbestos chapter 11 cases, the debtors virtually always assert that trust are "insurance neutral," meaning that whatever happens in the bankruptcy court does not effect the rights of insurers. Based on that claimed neutrality, the debtors and plaintiff's lawyers almost always argue that the tort claim insurers lack "standing" to be involved in the bankruptcy court proceedings.

Insurers sometimes but not always disagree, depending on what view suits a particular insurer's interest in a particular chapter 11 case and its overall financial status. Usually, but not always, insurers that issued primary policies re heavily exposed to the tort claims, and so will seek to cut a deal with the debtor and the plaintiff's bar in order to achieve certainty. Other insurers that issued higher level excess policies tend to fight the debtor on the standing issue until they've created enough of a record that the debtor agrees to accept from the high-level insurer a nominal payment over time in return for a release of all obligations under the higher-level excess insurance policy.

The motion also is noteworthy for what it does not mention. For one, it makes no mention of the current or future rights of other, solvent companies that are now or will in the future end up as co-defendants in the underlying lawsuits. Co-defendant entities can be incredibly harmed by the terms of the bankruptcy trust if the terms cut off or in any way limits the right of co-defendants to bring cross-claims or equitable contribution claims against the debtor or the trust. In the chapter 11 asbestos cases, the trust terms almost always have imposed severe and unconstitutional limits on the rights of the co-defendants to bring cross-claims against the debtor or the trust. To be fair to co-defendants, bankruptcy courts can and should appoint at least one person to represent the interests of fat least future co-defendants.

Additional adverse impacts arise for co-defendants if secrecy is allowed regarding claims submitted to the trust fund and its payouts to particular claimants. Once again, the chapter 11 trust model should not be followed because in most such cases, the plan tosses a veil of secrecy over information regarding which claimants have made claims and what they have been paid. Co-defendants rightly argue that the veil of secrecy is poor public policy because court-ordered trusts should instead be transparent as a matter of public policy. Beyond pure policy issues, the veil of secrecy also is improper because it blocks the co-defendants from asserting state law rights. Secrecy also blocks legislators from understanding what really is or is not being done to compensate legitimate and illegitimate claimants.

The motion also is significant because it does not mention various other sources of conflicts between constituencies with interests in the terms of a trust created to resolve tort system claims. One source of conflicts is that persons with strong and serious claims do not want to see trust fund money frittered away on payments to spurious or marginal claimants. Once again the asbestos chapter 11 cases highlight the problem because most of the trusts have been put in place with terms that have allowed billions of dollars to be paid to claimants who are not "sick" in any meaningful way.

Here are key excerpts from the Tousa motion:

4. Among other things, the Debtors are aware of the recent plan of reorganization confirmed in the chapter 11 cases of WCI Communities, Inc. and certain of its affiliates (collectively, "WCI") in which WCI successfully managed its liability with respect to Chinese Drywall by implementing a global strategy that will address Chinese Drywall claims through the use of a trust, a channeling injunction and claims liquidation procedures. Additionally, the plan of reorganization permitted WCI to efficiently address its' claims against its insurance carriers as well as the installers and manufacturers of Chinese Drywall. While the Debtors continue to analyze their own Chinese Drywall cases and their prospects for a chapter 11 plan, the WCI approach offers one possible alternative to piecemeal litigation of Chinese Drywall claims.

5. The Debtors intend to work with their major creditor constituencies in an effort to establish a global strategy with respect to claims arising from or relating to Chinese Drywall. This global strategy will prevent a "race" to insurance proceeds by similarly situated claimants that will have the negative effect of depleting the amount of insurance available to satisfy other claims or, otherwise, impact the Debtors' ability, as a practical matter, to craft a more comprehensive resolution of the Chinese Drywall-related claims. To that end, the Debtors intend to involve the alleged holders of Chinese Drywall-related claims and the Debtors' insurance carriers in any such discussions. Based on the Debtors' desire to develop a global resolution of the Movants and similar claims, the Debtors have filed this objection.


Hat tip to LAW360 for noting the motion to continue the automatic stay.

Update on Bates White Paper on Impact of Asbestos Bankruptcies

Now online here at no expense is a new paper by the economists at Bates White. The paper is titled "The Naming Game" and is well-worth reading because it uses data from Alameda County to prove the reality that when defendants have exited the tort system to chapter 11, plaintiffs lawyers have in fact sought out and sued new defendants with increasing frequency. The paper also raises other interesting questions for discussion another day regarding the practices of plaintiff's lawyers in collecting money from asbestos trusts AFTER they have finished collecting money in the tort system.


The online article is a reprint from the September 2 issue of the Mealey's report for Asbestos Litigation.

Update on GM and Chrysler as to Asbestos Claims

An update seems appropriate in light of the "new" cert petition filed in early September, and comments this week from the asbestos plaintiff's bar (Joseph Rice of Motley Rice and Robert Phillips of SimmonsCooper) during a seminar panel discussion on the status of various chapter 11 cases. The bottom lines seem to be as follows as to Chrysler and GM.

1) As I've described before, the Second Circuit's August 5 opinion in Chrysler explicitly articulated caveats as to which if any tort claimants will be bound by the rulings to date. That was obviously a victory for the asbestos plaintiff's bar and they ultimately decided it was a strong enough win to make the choice not to pursue further appeals in GM or Chrysler. Instead, they will in the future fight the issues of which if any would-be future plaintiffs are bound and as to what issues.

2) The Indiana Pension Fund plaintiffs are now trying to obtain certiorari on the fundamental issue of whether section 363 asset sales can be used to sidestep the normal confirmation process. Go here for a Scotusblog summary and a link to the cert petition. As Todd Brown has described before in pointoflaw.com, and as is described in other posts collected here, the rights of future plaintiffs can be or have been sacrificed in the context of section 363 sales since that process allows the debtor to avoid many of the "rigors" (such as they may be) of the confirmation process. And, as I've pointed out, that group of future plaintiffs includes asbestos co-defendants and subrogated insurers. So, if granted, the certiorari petition would raise issues of importance to future chapter 11 cases that include mass tort claims.

The Value of E-discovery and Tort Law - Trial Judge Says Internal Emails Probably Hang UBS on Claims of Fraud in Connection with Sale of CDOs

The WSJ Law blog includes this post yesterday that illustrates the virtues of e-discovery and the ever-expanding use of tort law in claims between businesses. The post, by Ashby Jones, reports on and includes a link to a Connecticut opinon in which the buyer of cdos sued the seller (UBS) for fradulent concealment of material facts regarding an impending downgrade of the rating for the cdos. The post includes a link to the trial judge's nicely written opinion granting a motion for prejudgment secuurity for about $ 35 million. The opinion lays the facts that caused the judge to grant the motion, and relies in material part on quotes from various internal e-mails at UBS in which the securities were internally disparaged at UBS - before sale - as "crap" and "vomit."

The entire post and opinion make for an easy read for those interested in the litigation arising out of the recent financial fiascoes. For those who are not inclined to scan it all, here's a key quote that illustrates why paying for e-discovery can be worth it and why tort claims are seeing increasing use in litigation between businesses:


"But the court finds there is more to this case than that. Through direct and circumstantial evidence, Pursuit has established probable cause to sustain the validity of a claim that the UBS defendants were in possession of material nonpublic information regarding imminent ratings downgrades on the Notes it sold to the Plaintiffs, information UBS withheld from the Plaintiffs.

The use of the term "triggerless," which was used by UBS to entice the Plaintiffs to purchase the same Notes they had earlier rejected, is akin to a representation by UBS that a gun being handed to the Plaintiffs is not loaded, when in fact UBS knew the gun was not only loaded, but was about to go off. The court takes UBS employees at their word when they referenced their Notes, these purported "investment grade" securities which they sold, as "crap" and "vomit", for UBS alone possessed the knowledge of what their product, their inventory, was truly worth. While UBS would argue that such descriptors lack a precisemeaning, the true meaning of these words and the true value of UBS's wares becameabundantly clear when the Plaintiffs' multi-million dollar investment was completely wiped out and liquidated by UBS shortly after the last of the Note purchases was consummated.

That is the difference between a risk that something might happen to change the value of an investment, which is both a fact of life and a risk shared by all parties to any securities transaction, and the undisclosed knowledge that something will happen. That type of nondisclosure, whether it is on the part of a seller or a buyer, can cross the line into actionable securities fraud, and the court finds probable cause to sustain a finding that in this instance, it did. "

If You Like What You Read Here, Feel Free to Tell the ABA

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Mass Tort Lawyers - Perhaps Wise to Keep an Eye on the Pleadings Before Judge Rakoff in the B of A Case

The point of this post is to suggest that mass tort lawyers for publicly traded entities need to keep at least a watchful eye on the gist of the papers being filed before Judge Rakoff in New York regarding the settlement between Bank of America and the SEC with respect to disclosure of future bonuses. Why? For one, the filings illustrate the increasing focus on lawyers and law firms in connection with alleged or actual corporate misdeeds. For another, the papers suggest issues regarding whether it is appropriate to put disclosures in non-public schedules to m & a agreements. No doubt the plaintiff's bar for securities cases is loving the proceedings.
This post from Susan Beck at AmLaw provides a nice tight summary of the new filings. The following paragraph from her story illustrates the basic issues:

"In this most recent filing, the SEC continued to dodge the question of who was responsible for the disclosure decision and refused to identify anyone at fault at BofA. But it had no problem heaping blame on Wachtell. The agency brandished excerpts from two publications by Wachtell partners informing clients about a 2005 SEC report in which the agency stated that companies should not hide certain material information in nonpublic "disclosure schedules." BofA had previously argued in court filings that this practice is common in the M&A world."

Oh What Chapter 11 Could Do for a Soon to be Bankrupt Asbestos Mining Firm

Looks like another asbestos bankruptcy is ahead. This bankruptcy apparently will involve an asbestos mine in Zimbabwe, according to this article from The Zimbabwe Times. According to the article, the mine is not paying its 2,000 workers their meager weekly wages, and some say that the mine is crucial to Zimbawe's mining sector that supports much of the national economy and many jobs.

How easy it would be to solve the mining company's problem if only chapter 11 could be invoked. If that were so, then judging by rulings in cases such as GM, Chrysler and Lyondell, the near-bankrupt mining company could use chapter 11 to create an answer for its problems. To do that, it could find a buyer willing to purchase and operate the mine through a section 363 asset sale. The asset deal could include a term conditioning the deal on a Zimbabwe bankruptcy judge issuing a global injunction specifying that that the miners are enjoined from making an claims for past wages or from making any future claims for any disease that may arise from their work.

The Zimbabwean bankruptcy court also could use its awesome powers under Zimbabwe bankruptcy code section 105 to enter an injunction stating that if the workers at the mine ever become sick and sue for damages for asbestos-related disease, then the defendant entities in those tort suits are barred from suing the mining company for contribution. (Such co-defendants, might be, for example, a later employer and companies that sold equipment used at a manufacturing plant, say for example the seller of a large pump with one asbestos gasket that was serviced twice a year by some other person). Citing the mining company's desperate straits, its key role in the economy, and the lack of other willing buyers, the judge could quickly order a hearing to be held in a remote location far away from the mine on little or no notice to interested parties such as the miners and foreseeable future co-defendants, discovery could be truncated to the point of really not existing, and the hearing could be held in marathon sessions unavailable to most persons. Then the public hearing transcripts could be sequestered for 90 days afterwards.

Can you imagine the claims of "kangaroo court justice" that would follow from US lawyers if Zimbawe's legal system actually followed such a procedure and entered such orders?

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Here are key quotes from the article:

"ZVISHAVANE - The government and management at the country's major asbestos producer, Shabanie Mines, have failed to stop a week-long strike by the estimated 2 000 mine workers there.

Industry experts warn the prolonged job boycott by the asbestos miners could compound the company's financial problems and cost the country millions of dollars in lost export earnings.

The workers downed tools last Monday to press the State-owned Shabanie Mashaba Mines (SMM) to pay them salaries due to them since the beginning of the year.

The Zimbabwe Times was informed that the now largely bankrupt company has failed to pay workers since January and has randomly selected a few workers each month to pay appallingly low monthly stipends of as low as US$30. It has since emerged some of the workers are now demanding that the State-run multimillion-dollar asbestos producer be returned back to self-exiled businessman Mutumwa Mawere, the former owner.

Since January, the company has made only three pay outs and only to a quarter of the 2 000-strong workforce.

The stand-off was referred to an arbitrator in Masvingo in August, but he has failed to resolve the drawn-out labour dispute.


***

Since the takeover by government four years ago, the company has faced critical cash flow problems amid allegations of looting by top Zanu-PF officials. The mining firm is reportedly facing critical viability problems because of a hostile operating environment, and has for the past eight months failed to reach a compromise with the workers.

Several of Zimbabwe's mining firms face collapse also because of lack of hard cash to buy new machinery and spares.

The perceived high political risk because of Zimbabwe's lawlessness and political violence has also scared away foreign investors with investment funds to shore up the depressed mining sector."

New Bates White Paper on Asbestos Litigation, Bankruptcy Trusts, and Plaintiff's Habits in Naming Defendants

Just in time for upcoming asbestos litigation seminars. the economists at Bates White have issued a new report on asbestos litigation, asbestos trusts and the practices of plaintiff's lawyers in choosing and naming defendants to target in lawsuits. The article is well-worth reading as it uses data from Alameda County to prove the reality that as defendants have exited the tort system, plaintiffs lawyers seek out new defendants, among other things.

The article is in the new September 2 issue of the Mealey's report for Asbestos Litigation, or presumably is available through Lexis/Nexis in general.

The Tort Claim Industry - Seminar on Allocation of Losses Among Insurers and Insureds for "Nonproducts" Asbestos Cases and Environmental Cases

As noted before, substantive seminars are now a standard part of litigation industry and are indeed a driver of the industry. Today, for example, snail mail brought me brochures for seminars on drug and medical device litigation, automotive product liability litigation and food-borne illness litigation. The seminars usually are interesting because they bring the opposing sides together and force some dialog between the various constituencies. The participants of course do not put all of their cards on the table, but most seminars do produce some new insights and sometimes valuable data on a given substantive area if only because trial lawyers usually are competitive.

The tort litigation industry of course is driven by money. So, another significant part of the seminar industry is devoted to seminars and other educational forums in which the attendees focus on the distribution of financial responsibility for the underlying claims. Seminars of this sort run the gamut, including seminars regarding how to seek out insurance coverage, seminars on when insurers properly deny coverage, and issues between and among insureds, insurers and reinsurers. All of the issues of course must arise from some underlying set of facts, and then a variety of arguments regarding how the facts and attendant financial losses would or should be allocated between or among the various actors in the underlying facts, and their insurers and reinsurers. An example of this sort of seminar landed in my email in-box again this week and prompts this excursus. Specifically, Bates White and Environ will next week host a Chicago conference in which they will talk about the ways in which science and economics come together with respect to allocations of underlying losses from certain types of asbestos cases and "environmental cases."

The link for seminar registration is here, and attendance is free. See below for key excerpts from the description.
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Qualifying & Estimating Environmental Damages:How and when are policies triggered?

Losses to businesses or insurers from asbestos, environmental, and health hazards are inherently uncertain due to the long-term nature of such potential exposures. However the uncertainty can be mitigated by better understanding the damages and by understanding when and how much insurance will be triggered. This is accomplished through site evaluations, identifying all potential damages, and estimating future damages. For example, ongoing screening is done during site evaluations to determine when environmental damage (both historic and potential future) meets the definition of recoverability. These actions will ensure that companies and insurers alike know what potential costs will be and how they will be allocated.

Our experts from Bates White and Environ will demonstrate that for the typical policyholder facing potential environmental damages, our process and experience allows the insurer or policy holder to manage their risk moving forward. Quantifying Nonproduct Losses: How and when were claimants exposed?Which claimants' exposure to asbestos occurred during business operations and which claimants' exposure occurred afterwards? The answer to this question may determine if the policyholder's insurers owe tens of millions, hundreds of millions, or billions.

If a claim is determined to be a "products" claim, such that exposure did not occur during the policyholder's contracting operations, then insurance recoveries will be subject to the explicit aggregate limit specified in each insurance policy's products and completed exclusion clauses. In contrast, if a claimant claims exposure during the policyholder's operations, then the claim may fall outside exclusion clauses (such as a "non-products" claim) and the amount of insurance recovery may not be subject to an aggregate limit.

Our experts from Bates White and Environ will demonstrate that for the typical policyholder with contracting activities, a minority of its claimants were exposed while contracting activities were ongoing; the majority of claimants were exposed long after the contracting activities were completed. They will provide concrete examples. CLE accreditation of this program is approved in Illinois.

CLICK HERE BY SEP. 4 TO RESERVE YOUR SEAT

More on Bankuptcy Court Powers and Cutting Off Claims in Tort Cases

Today, more on the amazing world of bankruptcy where some say bankruptcy code section 105 may be used to issue an injunction to solve pretty much any and all problems of a debtor parent,including issuing injunctions to protect solvent subsidiaries.


Courtesy of LAW360, here's the link to an amazing adversary complaint filed in the Lyondell bankruptcy. There, the debtor seeks to enjoin creditors from suing 94 affiliated entities not yet in bankruptcy regarding a paltry $ 650 million. So, rather like the Tribune seeking to give the Cubs the benefit of bankruptcy without all the annoying hassles of being bankrupt, we now see yet another debtor seeking the benefits of bankruptcy without having to undergo the hassles of bankruptcy, all on the theory that issuing an injunction would in some way help the debtor. (Actually, Lyondell has done much the same thing before - this is just a new example.) I used to be impressed by the awesome power of federal district judges, but they may be pikers next to a bankruptcy judges wielding bankruptcy code section 105 powers.

Think about how this same principle could play out in the context of product laibility or other tort claims against uninsured subsidiaries of a debtor. For example,the next case may be a debtor asking the court to enjoin inconvenient things like co-defendants in tort suits bringing cross-claims against debtor entities not in bankruptcy. Thus, Parent Co. could file for chapter 11 but not put sits ubsidiaries into chapter 11. Parent Co. could then go to bankruptcy court to ask for an injunction barring cross-claims or tort claims against subsidiaries on the grounds it could be inconvenient to Parent Co.

Bad policy? Giving debtors that kind of power surely gets rids of some of the incentives to do responsible things like buying adequate insurance, carefully manufacturing well-designed products or otherwise acting responsibly. That outcome is bad news for responsible entities left as targets in the tort system. And, how do good lawyers craft meaningful warranty and indemnification agreements for sales of products between entities if tort and contract risks and obligations can all be terminated just by filing a petition for a parent entity.


Can you imagine the howls of "unfairness" and "bad policy" if a Chinese bankruptcy court issued such an order to protect non-bankrupt subsidiaries of a Parent Co. maker of defective cars that killed or maimed many people ?


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Here's a key quote from the complaint:

NATURE OF ACTION
1. This is an adversary proceeding brought pursuant to Rules 7001 and 7003
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules").

2. The Plaintiff-Debtors assert this complaint for a preliminary injunction
pursuant to section 105(a) of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), Rule
65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 7001(7) and 7065 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules") to enjoin until at least January 31, 2010 any
attempts to enforce any rights or exercise any remedy under the $615,000,000 and
€00,000,000 8.375% senior notes due August 15, 2015 (collectively, the "2015 Notes") against
guarantors of the 2015 Notes that have not filed a petition for chapter 11 protection (the "Non-
Debtor-Guarantors").